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ABSTRACT 
Department of the Navy system acquisition begins with 
a statement of user need. Delivery of required capability 
depends heavily on the effective translation of user need 
to system requirements. Failure typically results in 
program cost overruns, schedule slippage, and sometimes 
partial or complete failure to deliver needed capability. 
Architectures as part of systems engineering were 
created to cope with the growing complexity of modern 
systems. The Navy develops and operates some of the most 
complex systems in the world. Yet, architecture 
development, while mandated, remains largely ancillary to 
the systems engineering process. As a result, much of the 
engineering advantage of architectures remains untapped. 
This study examined U.S. Navy policy, process, and 
current engineering and architectures standards and 
identified recommendations to improve the process of 
translating user needs to system requirements while 
facilitating the use of architectures. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Successful translation of user needs to system 
requirements is foundational to successful product 
development. This translation occurs during the concept 
phase of the systems engineering process, “pre-Milestone B” 
per (DoD Instruction 5000.2, 2008). 
Requirements definition for DoN warfighting systems 
predominantly involves upgrades or modifications of 
existing systems. Even unprecedented systems have to 
integrate and interoperate with existing or “legacy” 
systems. Legacy requirements may be incomplete, ambiguous, 
out-of-date, or in conflict with other requirements. 
Similarly, legacy architectures may not be sufficiently 
developed to support requirements definition. 
Systems engineering principles and processes and 
system architecting methods were established in large 
measure to facilitate successful development of complex 
systems (INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook v. 3.1, 2007), 
(Rhodes, 2007). DoN requirements for planning and 
implementation of systems engineering are based on 
Government and industry standards and best practices. DoN 
also requires for major systems acquisitions, development 
of architecture products in accordance with the DoD 
Architecture Framework (DoD Architecture Framework, version 
1.5, 2007). However, DoN acquisition policy (SECNAVINST 
5000.2D, 2008) does not describe a relationship or 
dependency between architecture requirements and systems 
engineering requirements. Programs frequently develop 
architecture products through a process that is essentially 
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separate from the systems engineering process. This 
practice marginalizes the utility of architectures 
(Osvalds, 2006). 
The purpose of this research is to review and 
correlate systems engineering standards, the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (CJCSI 
3170.01F, 2007), (CJCSM 3170.01C, 207), and system 
architecting policy and standards, then, to formulate and 
present recommendations for improving the integration of 
systems engineering with system architecting, and the 
contribution of architectures to requirements definition. 
At the time of this writing, the JCIDS process, as 
well as DoN acquisition policy, require programs to develop 
DoDAF-compliant architecture products. For a typical, 
complex warfare system, substantial time and resources are 
required to develop those products. In spite of 
requirements to develop architecture products, there is 
substantial evidence that the architecture products are 
poorly executed. Architecture products form part of the 
foundation for requirements definition. Poor execution of 
system architecting and requirements definition leads to 
program delays, cost overruns, and products whose 
performance does not provide required capability. 
Therefore, better alignment and implementation of 
architecture development and systems engineering processes 
holds the potential to deliver greater value from 
architecture products and for those products to improve the 
output of the requirements definition process. Achievement 
of these objectives will facilitate more effective program 
management and will contribute to improved system 
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performance, system supportability, system 
interoperability, and system-of-systems integration. 
The systems engineering process spans the entirety of 
a product’s life cycle, from identification of a user need 
to system retirement and disposal. Descriptions of the 
systems engineering process life cycle phases in different 
standards are generally well correlated at a high level, 
with some semantic differences. The standards provide a 
framework of tasks, but do not provide the process detail, 
examples, or accommodation of differences among product 
types necessary to be sufficient as stand-alone source 
references from which a detailed, systems engineering plan 
(SEP) can be developed and implemented. System engineering 
standards neither preclude nor prescribe the use of 
architectures to support requirements analysis. System 
engineering guides and handbooks produced by the Services 
and by industry complement and augment the standards. Among 
both standards and guides, terminology is often not well-
defined and varies among standards and guides. For example, 
a “performance specification” in one guide may have a 
subtly different meaning in another guide. Variations and 
lack of implementation specificity among systems 
engineering process standards and guides can make it 
difficult to implement a uniform, auditable systems 
engineering process within an organization. 
To begin the systems engineering process, a customer 
presents a statement of need to a system developer. Through 
an iterative process between user and developer, a 
comprehensive set of system requirements is formed, 
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establishing the basis for design. The DoD has its own 
system for requirements generation. 
In 2003, the DoD implemented the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS), a top-down, 
joint capabilities (i.e., requirements) generation, 
validation, and prioritization system intended to reduce 
functionally overlapping, Service-specific systems as well 
as inadequate intra-Service and inter-Service 
interoperability among systems. The JCIDS process 
interjects additional steps between the statement of user 
need and the development of a system specification in 
comparison with a typical commercial systems engineering 
process as described in Fabrycky (2006). 
The JCIDS process, as incorporated into systems 
engineering processes described in the Naval Systems 
Engineering Guide (2004) offers the potential for a cross-
service requirements analysis and prioritization capability 
necessary to achieve the DoD’s mandate for capability-based 
acquisition. It could also use architectures as an 
analytical and management framework. However, research for 
this study indicates the use of architectures in 
conjunction with JCIDS is neither explicitly described nor 
explained in policy, and to date, the Services’ approaches 
to warfighting requirements continue to align to Service 
perspective rather than a Joint perspective. 
Understanding the role of system architecting as part 
of the system engineering process first requires definition 
of terms. To define “architecture framework” the terms 
“architecture” and “framework” must each be defined. The 
definition of architecture cited in the DoD Architecture 
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Framework Version 1.5 (2007) is: “the structure of 
components, their relationships, and the principles and 
guidelines governing their design and evolution over time.” 
Every existing system embodies an architecture. Webster’s 
II Dictionary (1984) defines framework as: “a basic 
arrangement, form, or system.” Rolf Siegers (2005) defined 
architecture framework simply as “a resource that aids in 
the development or description of an architecture.” Maier 
(2004) asserts that an architecture framework exhibits one 
or more of the following five characteristics: 
 
1. A definition of the word “architecture” 
2. A conceptual framework explaining key concepts or 
terms 
3. An approach to describing architectures 
4. Architectural methods (e.g., creating, analyzing, 
interpreting, realizing) 
5. A theory of how architectures and architectural 
descriptions fit into a larger context (e.g., 
systems engineering, design, etc.) 
 
Motivation to establish and utilize architecture 
frameworks can derive from business considerations, 
technical considerations, or both. An architecture 
framework used for enterprise product development can for 
example facilitate shorter product development cycles, 
lower manufacturing, support and upgrade costs, and a 
reduced number of functionally duplicative products. This 
accrual of benefits can be explained by a framework’s 
ability to make individual product architectures comparable 
and integratable, facilitating cross-product insights that 
would be otherwise difficult. From a technical perspective, 
and for the same reasons cited for the business 
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perspective, products developed in conformance with an 
architecture that is in turn developed in conformance with 
an architecture framework potentially exhibit a greater 
degree of interoperability, a simpler logistics support 
infrastructure, and in systems of systems, a greater 
ability to be reconfigured to adapt to changes in mission 
needs. The DoD architecture framework (2007) is cited in 
DoD requirements, acquisition, and systems engineering 
policy and guidance for both business and technical 
reasons. 
DoDAF use, specified in DoN policy and guidance, is 
the framework standard for architectures in DoN. However, 
considerable variation in DoDAF architecture implementation 
is evident within the boundaries of DoDAF compliance, such 
that architectures for different but related systems may 
not be effectively comparable or integratable. The current 
framework is necessary but not sufficient to ensure the 
effective use of architectures in acquisition and systems 
engineering. The DoDAF Version 2.0, currently in 
development, is intended to address some long-recognized 
limitations of the DoDAF, but the framework is only one 
part of what should be a multi-faceted approach to 
realizing the potential of architectures in the systems 
engineering process. 
The systems engineering process, the DoD requirements 
process, i.e., JCIDS, the DoD architecture framework, and 
to a limited extent, the DoD acquisition process constitute 
a complex system-of-systems in and of themselves. Process 
components critical to successful requirements translation 
in a systems engineering context and the necessary elements 
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of a good system specification can be identified in this 
system-of-systems. In turn, an approach for how best to 
integrate necessary process components can be developed. 
DoD and DoN requirements, acquisition, and systems 
engineering processes and associated guidance and standards 
comprise a substantial amount of interrelated data, even 
when limited to discussion of requirements development as 
in this study. Research performed for this study has 
revealed semantic inconsistencies and ambiguities as well 
as a multiplicity of system engineering processes, guidance 
and standards. This makes it difficult to trace data and 
process relationships in a systems engineering context. As 
a consequence it is difficult to rigorously and 
unambiguously trace a top-level operational requirement to 
a comprehensive and complete set of system requirements. 
This study asserts that for Naval warfare systems, the 
process of translation of user needs to system requirements 
is not sufficiently rigorous and repeatable to ensure 
consistently complete and valid system requirements. The 
result is significant increases to program cost, schedule 
and risk when requirements issues are resolved later in 
development. Government Accounting Office Report (GAO-08-
782T, 2008) states: 
At the strategic level, DOD does not prioritize 
weapon system investments and the department’s 
processes for matching warfighter needs with 
resources are fragmented and broken. Furthermore, 
the requirements and acquisition processes are 
not agile enough to support programs that can 
meet current operational requirements. At the 
program level, programs are started without 
knowing what resources will truly be needed and 
are managed with lower levels of product 
 xx
knowledge at critical junctures than expected 
under best practices standards. In the absence of 
such knowledge, managers rely heavily on 
assumptions about system requirements, 
technology, and design maturity, which are 
consistently too optimistic. This exposes 
programs to significant and unnecessary 
technology, design, and production risks, and 
ultimately damaging cost growth and schedule 
delays. 
Typical U.S. Navy surface combatants systems involve a 
number of constraints and characteristics that lead to 
significant complexity and difficulty in the requirements 
analysis process. However, this study illustrates a 
“blended” use case and Process for System Architecture and 
Requirements Engineering (PSARE) process, from which  
requirements and architectures models can be constructed in 
an integrated, structured, repeatable manner that when 
complete, provide the basis for a complete set of system 
requirements for complex systems. Furthermore, the 
requirements model is in fact an operational view of the 
system’s architecture and the architecture model represents 
the system view of the architecture, enabling generation of 
required DoDAF products. Importantly, the products are 
created by and for the systems engineering process. It is 
done in a way that provides a full accounting of 
requirements in a design. This type of process is not 
provided as part of the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF, 
2007) or the Naval Systems Engineering Guide (2004). 
In summary, a substantial body of work among 
Government and industry exists regarding system engineering 
standards and processes. Standards and practices have been 
evolved, refined, interpreted, and exercised over a period 
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of approximately 50 years. The value of systems engineering 
has been shown to lie in its ability to manage complexity 
in system development such that systems produced will 
consistently satisfy user needs. Yet, numerous examples 
exist of warfare systems that exceed schedule and cost 
requirements and do not meet operational requirements. 
Shortcomings appear to exist in the application and 
management of systems engineering principles. 
The JCIDS process, ostensibly dependent on 
architectures as an analytical basis, has not resulted in 
desired levels of improvement in terms of ensuring Joint 
solutions, supporting capability acquisition, and reducing 
redundant or excess capability, while reliability 
identifying capability gaps. This may be partly a result of 
insufficiently developed architectural bases for the 
necessary analysis. 
In spite of mandated systems engineering and 
architecture standards, the relationship between system 
architecting and system engineering is poorly identified in 
DoD policy and instructions, and processes to develop 
architecture models as part of a systems engineering 
process are not prescribed. Until a better connection 
between system architecting and systems engineering is 
made, architecture development efforts will be 
significantly challenged to demonstrate a clear return on 
investment. 
Translation of operational requirements to a set of 
system requirements is a vitally important part of the 
systems engineering process. However, ambiguity exists in 
definition of engineering and analytical roles, in terms 
 xxii
and definitions, and in the dependencies of timing of 
events in this process. As a result, demonstration of 
system requirements completeness and linkage of system 
requirements to operational requirements are not 
consistently established. 
Rigorous methods exist to model system requirements 
and architectures in a manner that supports mandated DoD 
Architecture Framework products while maintaining close-
coupling with the systems engineering process. These 
methods can capture the behavior of complex, Naval warfare 
systems, maintain traceability to higher level 
requirements, and incorporate plain language views of 
requirements. However, the community of skilled 
practitioners may not be large enough to increase the use 
of these methods to the point of becoming standard 
practices. 
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Department of Navy (DoN) warfare systems are becoming 
more complex. At the same time, the DoN is also moving 
toward implementation of network-centric warfare and 
increasingly complex systems-of-systems. One effect of 
these trends on systems acquisition is significantly 
greater requirements complexity. Proper identification of 
requirements is a tenet of systems engineering. Based on 
statistical analysis of Department of Defense (DoD) 
programs performed by the Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU), 80% of a system’s life cycle cost is determined by 
the time 20% of a system’s actual cost is accrued. Within 
that first 20% of cost lies the concept phase of a program, 
accounting for, on average, 8% of the cost. It is during 
that concept phase, “pre-Milestone B” per (DoD Instruction 
5000.2, 2008) that user requirements are translated to 
system requirements (INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook v. 
3.1, 2007). Some well-known examples of failures resulting 
from poorly defined, verified, or validated requirements 
sets are discussed by Bahill (2004). 
Specifically, the complexity of requirements is 
dependent upon required functionality, the number and 
nature of nodes with which the system will interoperate, 
the extent to which the system, or system-of-systems can be 
reconfigured, and the range of environments and conditions 
in which the system is expected to operate. Note that 
operational flexibility, high interconnectivity and high  
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reconfigurability are all considered valuable attributes by 
the DoN and are typically required design attributes of new 
systems or system upgrades. 
For DoN warfighting systems the requirements 
definition challenge is compounded by the fact that 
development programs predominantly involve upgrades of 
existing systems. Even truly new systems have to 
interoperate with existing or “legacy” systems. Legacy 
requirements may be incomplete, ambiguous, out-of-date, in 
conflict with other requirements, or un-testable. 
Similarly, legacy architectures may not be sufficiently 
developed to support requirements or interface analysis. 
Systems engineering principles and processes and 
architecture frameworks were established in large measure 
to facilitate successful development of complex systems 
(INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook v. 3.1, 2007), 
(Rhodes, 2007). DoN requires the planning for and use of 
systems engineering based on Government and industry 
standards and best practices. For major acquisition 
programs, DoN also requires the development of architecture 
products in accordance with DoD Architecture Framework (DoD 
Architecture Framework, version 1.5, 2007). DoN acquisition 
policy (SECNAVINST 5000.2D, 2008) does not however 
recognize a relationship or dependency between required 
architectures and systems engineering requirements. DoN 
guidance (Naval systems engineering guide, 2004), (Naval 
“systems of systems” systems engineering guidebook, 2006) 
does recognize and describe the contribution of 
architectures in the requirements definition process. 
However guidance, by definition, cannot mandate use of 
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architectures for the requirements definition part of the 
system engineering process. Programs frequently develop 
architectures through a process that is essentially 
separate from the systems engineering process. This 
practice marginalizes the utility of architectures 
(Osvalds, 2006). 
B. PURPOSE: 
The purpose of this research is to: 
• Correlate systems engineering industry standards, 
Department of the Navy standards, the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(CJCSI 3170.01F, 2007), (CJCSM 3170.01C, 207), 
and recent systems engineering research as 
evidenced in published technical papers; and 
similarly, architecture and architecture 
framework industry and defense policy, standards, 
guidance, and technical papers. The research 
focuses on the portion of the systems engineering 
process leading up to and including system 
requirements definition. This correlation should 
reveal the extent to which Navy system 
engineering and architecture policy and guidance 
reflects best industry standards and practices 
and current research efforts. It should also 
provide insight on the potential versus realized 
utility of architectures in the requirements 
definition process, and the extent to which DoN 
policy and guidance support the use of 
architectures for requirements definition. 
• Present recommendations for improving the 
contribution of architectures to requirements 
definition. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS: 
Question: Within DoN, how can system architecting, 
e.g., architectures described in compliance with DoD 
Architecture Framework version 1.5 (2007), be better 
integrated with the systems engineering process to improve 
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requirements analysis and system requirements generation. 
In order to answer that question, the following questions 
and others concerning DoD policy, industry standards, 
system engineering and architecture semantics, and the 
engineering experience of others are also considered: 
• What is an architecture framework and what is the 
intended purpose(s)? 
• What are the advantages and objectives of system 
architecting for DoN systems during and as part 
of the requirements definition process? 
• How do system architecting processes relate to 
the systems engineering process? 
• What strategies, methodologies, or tools exist 
for integration of architecture development and 
requirements generation processes? 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
At the time of this writing, the JCIDS process, as 
well as DoN acquisition policy, require programs to develop 
DoDAF-compliant architecture products. For a typical, 
complex warfare system, substantial time and resources are 
required to develop those products. In spite of 
requirements to develop architecture products there is 
substantial evidence that the architecture products are 
poorly executed. The architecture products should form the 
analytical framework for the requirements definition 
process. Poor execution of system architecting and 
requirements definition leads to program delays, cost 
overruns, and products whose performance does not provide 
the required capability. Therefore, better alignment and 
implementation of architecture development and systems 
engineering processes holds the potential for the DoN to 
derive greater value from architecture products and for 
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those products to improve the output of the requirements 
definition process. Achievement of these objectives will 
facilitate more effective program management and will 
contribute to improved system performance, system 
supportability, system interoperability, and system-of-
systems integration. 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Scope 
This study focuses on Department of Navy warfare 
system requirements development. As such, it emphasizes 
software-intensive and complex systems, systems-of-systems, 
and integration and interoperability of new systems and 
newly modified legacy systems with legacy systems. 
Incorporation of Joint and coalition architectures and 
requirements is included to the extent required by 
discussion and analysis of the JCIDS process and DoN 
policy. 
Although the systems engineering process and 
architecture framework requirements derived from DoD 
requirements and imposed by DoN are a primary topic, other 
established, in-development, and conceptualized processes 
and frameworks are included to better understand and 
illustrate where improvements or changes to DoN standards 
may merit consideration. As one example, the DoD 
Architecture Framework (DoDAF) version 2.0 is under 
development and its goals and objectives are considered. 
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2. Methodology 
This study is primarily composed of the results of 
researching and analyzing documents from DoD, DoN, 
industry, and academia. Process steps include: 
1. Conduct literature review and analysis of 
architecture frameworks, architecture development 
and use, and the requirements definition portion 
of systems engineering processes. 
2. Correlate established systems engineering and 
architecture standards and processes with DoN 
requirements and guidance. 
3. Research and discuss the state of practice of the 
requirements definition portion of the systems 
engineering process and the architecture 
development process in DoN or DoD. 
4. Develop recommendations to improve integration of 
architecture development with requirements 
development. 
5. Demonstrate by example, better integration of 
architectures with system engineering processes. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The fundamental premise of this paper is that 
understanding a problem is the most important step toward a 
solution. The structure of this paper overall, is to 
examine systems engineering, requirements-setting, and 
architecture standards, guidance and processes, observe 
their strengths and weaknesses, consider where process gaps 
or lack of process synchronization may exist and recommend 
improvements. 
Chapter II focuses on the systems engineering process, 
both in the DoD, industry, and academia. Chapter III 
reviews the initiation of user requirements, particularly 
from a DoD perspective. Chapter IV provides an overview of 
the evolution of the DoD Architecture Framework (2007). 
 7
Chapter V considers the integration of component processes, 
and Chapter VI presents development of system requirements 
and architectures in a DoN warfare system context. The last 
chapter, Chapter VII, presents conclusions and 
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II. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section begins with an overview of the systems 
engineering life cycle. Subsequent sections present a 
literature review of industry standards and DoD and DoN 
policy and standards. Emphasis is placed on the beginning 
of the systems engineering process; the requirements 
definition phase. 
B. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS LIFE CYCLE 
The systems engineering process spans the entirety of 
a product’s life cycle, from identification of a user need 
to system retirement and disposal. In texts commonly used 
for university-level system engineering education, 
descriptions of the systems engineering process life cycle 
phases are generally well correlated at a high level, 
albeit with some semantic differences. In Blanchard and 
Fabrycky’s Systems Engineering and Analysis (2006), the 
phases, in sequence, are identified as: Conceptual Design, 
Preliminary Design, Detail Design and Development, 
Production/Construction, and Operational Use and System 
Support. These phases are structured to follow a system’s 
life cycle. The sequence is shown graphically in Figure 1 
(Blanchard, 2006:31). By comparison, Figure 2 (INCOSE 
Systems Engineering Handbook, 2007) shows alternative 
definitions of life cycle phases. 
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Figure 1 Systems Engineering Process, From Blanchard, 
2006. 
This shows systems engineering activities, milestones, and 




Figure 2 System Life Cycles, From INCOSE SE Handbook v3.1, 
2007. 
High-level similarities of various standards, and 
differences at a more detailed level are illustrated. 
 
Systems engineering process models, for example the 
“Vee” model, the spiral model, and the waterfall model 
(Blanchard, 2006), provide systems engineering activity 
timing, logic, and sequence structure for the systems 
engineering process. They are applied to each of the life 
cycle phases to establish an agreed-to structure for 
product development and to facilitate understanding of 
development progress, status, and risk. 
The objective of this section is to identify the life 
cycle phases, typical associated activities and engineering 
products, and to highlight the requirements analysis 
portion of the life cycle, a focus of this study. To manage 
the scope and complexity of this study, the systems 
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engineering process is predominantly described linearly and 
progress is discussed in terms of requirements development 
maturity and detail. Consequently, differences in system 
engineering process models and bases for selection are 
beyond the scope of this study. 
This linear simplification makes comparison of the 
systems engineering process with other related processes 
easier, i.e., the DoN acquisition process (SECNAVINST 
5000.2D), the DoN Requirements/Acquisition Two Pass, Six 
Gate Review Process (SECNAVINST 5000.2D, 2008), and the 
JCIDS process (CJCSM 3170.01C, 2007). 
For this study, discussion of the systems engineering 
process is primarily concerned with what Blanchard (2006) 
describes as the Conceptual Design phase. As seen in Figure 
1, an output of this phase is an “A spec” or system 
specification, or functional baseline, all taken to be 
equivalent in systems engineering terms. The system 
specification is defined as “…the top ‘technical-
requirements’ document that provides overall guidance for 
system design from the beginning” (Blanchard, 2006: 86). 
Placement of system specification development in the 
timeline of the DoN acquisition process is after the 
Capabilities Definition Document (CDD). The CDD, defined in 
CJCSM 3170.01C (2007) is an entrance criterion for 
Milestone B which leads into System Development & 
Demonstration (DoDI 5000.02, 2008) or “Preliminary Design” 
per Figure 1. It follows that the system specification 
represents the top of the specification hierarchy or 
“specification tree” for product development. 
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C. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS CHARACTERIZATION OF ESTABLISHED 
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING STANDARDS 
Several key systems engineering standards exist. Some 
have been developed from or in coordination with others. 
Problems arising from multiple frameworks and standards are 
addressed in Sheard (1997). That paper discusses framework 
trends that include: evolution, proliferation, integration 
and coordination, and consolidation. Although the value of 
evolution, i.e., improvement, is recognized, continually 
changing and overlapping frameworks and standards create a 
burden on companies required to comply with different 
frameworks for different programs. Also, from the 
standpoints of both the invoking organization and the 
complying organization, a succession of changing frameworks 
and standards whose page counts typically number in the 
hundreds makes it more difficult to establish and maintain 
individual and organizational expertise and experience with 
requirements, compliant processes, and products. 
In the 11 years since Sheard (1997), the cited trends 
have for the most part continued. More recently, there has 
been some increased focus on consolidation of hardware and 
software frameworks and standards. As is pointed out by 
Sheard, “…frameworks define characteristics of good 
processes but do not prescribe how they should be enacted.” 
Most Services have attempted to address this “gap” by 
publishing more prescriptive systems engineering guides 
based on a small number of established frameworks and 
standards. 
The primary standards cited by the Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook, Chapter 4, (DAG, 2004) are: 
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• ISO/IEC 15288, Systems Engineering – System Life 
Cycle Processes (2008) 
• EIA 632, Processes for Engineering a System 
(1999) 
• IEEE 1220, Application Management of the Systems 
Engineering Process (2007). 
The systems engineering framework standard for the 
Naval Systems Engineering Guide is EIA 632. 
1. ISO/IEC 15288 (2008) 
This standard is written with a broad scope, 
identifying the following four system life cycle process 
groups: Agreement processes, Organizational Project-
Enabling Processes, Project Processes, and Technical 
Processes. Within the Technical Processes life cycle 
process group lie the “Stakeholder Requirements Definition 
Process” (ISO/IEC 15288, 2008:36) and “Requirements 
Analysis Process” (ISO/IEC 15288, 2008:39) which are 
central to this study. Each process is described in terms 
of its purpose, outcomes, and activities and tasks. The 
descriptions are written at a high level of abstraction, 
establishing essentially a framework to which detailed 
process information can be appended. IEEE Std 1220 (2005) 
is specifically cited as a standard to be used with ISO/IEC 
15288 and updates of these two documents are synchronized. 
There is no mention of the use of architectures in the 
accomplishment of stakeholder requirements definition or 
requirements analysis. The section that follows 
“Requirements Analysis Process” is “Architecture Design 




synthesize a solution that satisfies system requirements,” 
which is beyond the requirements definition phase and 
outside the scope of this study. 
2. IEEE Std 1220 (2005), IEEE Standard for 
Application and Management of the Systems 
Engineering Process 
This Standard provides more detailed process 
requirements than ISO/IEC 15288 and can be used in 
conjunction with that standard. The “System Definition 
Stage” defined in IEEE Std 1220 (2005:21) aligns with the 
aforementioned “Stakeholder Requirements Definition 
Process” and “Requirements Analysis Process” from ISO/IEC 
15288 (2008), however that stage goes beyond development of 
a system requirements document and includes the product 
specification (i.e. allocated baseline) and preliminary 
subsystem specifications. The IEEE Std 1220 addresses the 
process of system definition and associated specifications, 
configuration baselines, and technical reviews. Verified 
functional and design architectures (IEEE Std 1220, 
2005:21) are identified as products of this  
process, but the latter pertains to a product specification 
and the former is not presented as a means of facilitating 
requirements analysis. 
3. EIA 632 (1999), Processes for Engineering a 
System 
Among the five processes identified by this standard 
as comprising the engineering process are thirteen sub-
processes. A total of 33 requirements address those sub-
processes. The standard is organized around those 33 
requirements. Under the sub-process Requirements Definition 
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Process Requirements are three requirements: Acquirer 
Requirements, Other Stakeholder Requirements, and System 
Technical Requirements. The descriptions of and outputs for 
those three requirements align with the subject of this 
study. In particular, the output of System Technical 
Requirements, the System Requirements Document, aligns with 
this study. Each requirement section includes tasks to 
consider, and related outcomes are defined in Annex C. 
Annex G defines requirements relationships, e.g., 
hierarchy, dependency, etc. The “how-to” of tasks is noted 
as being beyond the scope of the standard. Although the 
data, analysis, configuration management, and product 
elements involved in completion of the tasks supports 
system architecture development, architectures as part of 
the Requirements Definition Process Requirements are only 
mentioned in the context of “open systems architecture.” 
D. INDUSTRY, DOD, AND NASA SYSTEMS ENGINEERING GUIDEBOOKS 
In addition to systems engineering standards, the 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2004) cites systems 
engineering handbooks and guides including: Naval Systems 
Engineering Guide (2004), INCOSE S.E. Handbook (2007), NASA 
S.E. Handbook (2007), DAU Systems Engineering Fundamentals 
(2001), ISO/IEC TR 19760, Systems Engineering – A Guide for 
the Application of ISO/IEC 15288 (System Life Cycle 
Processes), First Edition, 2003-11-15 (2008), and SMC 
Systems Engineering Primer and Handbook (2005). All of 
these guides and handbooks are specifically or generally 
based on the previously-mentioned ISO/IEC-IEEE and EIA 
standards, but they add Service or Agency specific process  
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information and in some cases provide implementation 
information that is beyond the scope of the ISO/IEC-IEEE 
and EIA standards. 
The Naval Systems Engineering Guide specifically cites 
EIA-632 as its standards basis and presents the processes 
from that standard, adapted for DoN use. The intent of its 
creation and signature by all major Navy acquisition 
commands (MARCORSYSCOM, NAVAIR, NAVSEA, NAVSUP, and 
SPAWAR,) was to establish a single, documented, systems 
engineering process for DoN. Starting with EIA-632, the 
systems commands added command-specific content. The result 
was addition of consideration for DoN policies and 
procedures, and specific implementation guidance for EIA-
632 processes. Descriptions of engineering artifacts 
provided apply to NAVAIR systems command but not other 
systems commands. Notably, the guide does not try to index 
the systems engineering process to an acquisition process 
timeline context. Also, references are made to the use of 
architectures during the requirements definition phase. 
The INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook (2007) is 
intended to provide descriptions of key systems engineering 
process activities. It is written to be consistent with 
ISO/IEC 15288-2002 (Note: This standard was superseded by 
ISO/IEC 15288-2008). As such it is not tailored to the 
engineering of DoD or DoN systems. The handbook is 
structured around context diagrams to augment ISO/IEC 
15288, showing inputs, outputs, controls and enablers for 
each ISO/IEC 15288 process. Portions of the standard 
pertinent to this study are: Section 4.2, Stakeholder 
Requirements Definition Process, Section 4.3, Requirements 
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Analysis Process, Section 4.4, Architectural Design 
Process, and Appendices I and K, “Requirements Definition 
Process” and “System Architecture Synthesis” respectively. 
These appendices add considerably more detail regarding how 
to perform these processes. The handbook asserts that 
“Architectural design begins from the baseline functional 
and performance requirements, architectural constraints, 
and traceability matrix.” (INCOSE Handbook, 2007), i.e., 
well into the requirements development process. However, 
Appendix I, Requirements Definition Process, discusses 
description of system behavior, system interfaces, flow- 
down of requirements and, creating models, i.e., activities 
associated with architecture development. Therefore, while 
development of architectures to support requirements 
definition and analysis is not specifically called out in 
the standard, their use in this manner is consistent with 
the guidance in the standard. 
The NASA Systems Engineering Handbook (2007) is based 
on high-level NASA systems engineering policy, systems 
engineering best practices collected across the NASA 
organization, and Government, industry and academic 
sources. The bibliography is extensive and includes EIA-632 
(1999), ISO/IEC 15288 (2008), the DoD Architecture 
Framework (2007) and many other sources which also form the 
basis for DoN systems engineering policy and processes. The 
two sections of the handbook most pertinent to this study 
are sections 4.2, Technical Requirements Definition, and 
4.3, Logical Decomposition. The former describes a process 
of interactively and recursively translating stakeholder 
expectations into a set of validated technical requirements 
with measures of performance, taking into consideration 
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constraints and the operational concept. The recommended 
means of documenting these requirements is “…in acceptable 
‘shall’ statements, which are complete sentences with a 
single ‘shall’ per statement.” The latter prescribes as a 
first step, establishment of a system architecture model. 
These two NASA process steps align well with ISO/IEC 
15288’s “Stakeholder Requirements Definition” and 
“Requirements Analysis” process steps with the notable 
exception of the NASA handbook including architecture 
development. 
The U.S. Air Force SMC Systems Engineering Primer & 
Handbook (2005) is sponsored by the Space and Missile 
Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base, Los Angeles, 
CA. The close relationship of Air Force and NASA 
engineering for Air Force space systems explains the SMC 
S.E. Primer (2005) citation of NASA documents such as the 
NASA Systems Engineering Handbook. Other references include 
military, industrial and academic sources frequently cited 
by DoD and DoN guidance such as DAU’s System Engineering 
Fundamentals (2001), EIA 632 (1999), IEEE Std 1220 (2005), 
The INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook (2007), and Systems 
Engineering and Analysis (Blanchard, 2006). However, for 
the portion of references most specifically pertinent to 
this study, those in Appendix D, References and 
Bibliography, “Mission Requirements,” the references are 
NASA references. The USAF handbook is laid out somewhat 
differently than the other handbooks, with a major chapters 
dedicated to:  systems engineering “primer,” how the 
systems engineering process works, system life cycles 
phases, systems engineering management, system engineering 
tools, “companion disciplines to systems engineering,” and 
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validation and verification. As a result, material 
addressing requirements analysis is spread across major 
chapters in the handbook. 
The primer establishes some semantic basis for terms 
used throughout the text. Chapter II discusses requirements 
analysis and includes development of a functional 
architecture, “…how the functions will operate together to 
perform the system mission(s).” A figure on page 51 of the 
text shows a notional functional architecture for a space 
system, including depiction of system functions provided by 
existing space assets. This notion of incorporating 
existing architectures in new system development is an 
important point that is further discussed, later in this 
study. Chapter III focuses on relating the U.S.A.F-specific 
National Security Space (NSS) system development process to 
the acquisition process described in DoD Instruction 5000.2 
(2008). Chapter IV is a treatise on systems engineering 
management. It does not provide further discussion of 
requirements analysis. Chapter V discusses systems 
engineering tools. There are references to sources that 
provide comparisons of specific software-based tools, i.e., 
software products, but this section’s emphasis is on 
analytical techniques commonly found useful, arranged by 
systems engineering process phase. Such tools as they apply 
to architecture development are discussed as are 
requirements management tools. The U.S.A.F. has developed a 
Government-owned tool called “Requirements Development and 
Validation” (RDAV) for maintaining a database of 
requirements, specifications and constraints. Chapter VI, 
“What are the Companion Disciplines to Systems Engineering” 
discusses primarily engineering specialty disciplines such 
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as producibility, reliability, and safety. This chapter 
does not augment the discussion of requirements analysis, 
nor does Chapter VII, “Validation and Verification.” 
Among the four appendices included is 111 page, 
Appendix C, “Templates and Examples,” which contains 
templates and examples for common systems engineering 
tasks. Section C5 of this appendix, “Techniques of 
Functional Analysis,” includes the methodologies and 
rationale for functional flow block diagrams and timeline 
analysis. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Figure 3 summarizes the attributes of the major 
standards and handbooks used by the DoN, allowing a more 
direct comparison of major similarities and differences. 
 
Figure 3 Comparison of SE Standards, From Langford, 2006. 
The oldest standard, Mil-Std-499B has the narrowest scope, 
the newest, ISO 15288, has the broadest scope. IEEE 1220 is 
complementary to ISO 15288 and adds process detail. 
 
The standards in general provide a framework of tasks, 
but not enough process detail, examples, or explanation of 
process variations for different product types to serve as 
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stand-alone source references from which a detailed, 
systems engineering plan (SEP) could be developed. For 
requirements analysis, the use of architectures is neither 
precluded nor prescribed. Systems engineering guides add 
detail, implementation considerations, and examples, and 
should be used as an adjunct to chosen standards. Among  
standards and guides, there are common threads. Semantics 
are often not well-defined and vary among standards and 
guides. A “performance specification” in one guide may have 
a subtly different meaning in another guide. Further, 
products such as performance specifications allow for 
variation in implementation. This allowable variation, 
together with the iterative and recursive nature of the 
requirements analysis makes it difficult to form a specific 
view of the sequence of process steps from user need 
through finalization of a performance specification that 
fits all product development situations. 
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III. ESTABLISHING USER NEED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In discussing the systems engineering process, a 
description was presented wherein the customer would 
present a statement of need to the developer. Through an 
iterative process between user and developer, that 
requirement, including operational considerations and 
constraints is further developed to form a comprehensive 
set of system requirements from which product design 
begins. This chapter discusses the initial steps of the 
requirements setting process. 
In 2003, DoD implemented the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS), a top-down, 
joint capabilities (i.e., requirements) generation, 
validation, and prioritization system intended to reduce 
functional redundancy resulting from Service-specific 
systems as well as inadequate intra-Service and inter-
Service interoperability among Services’ systems. The JCIDS 
process interjects additional steps between the statement 
of user need and the development of a system specification 
relative to a typical systems engineering process as 
described in Fabrycky (2006). This chapter places the JCIDS 
process in the context of a systems engineering process and 
discusses its effectiveness. 
B. THE JCIDS PROCESS 
Figure 4 (Gonzales, 2007) shows the relationship of 
the JCIDS to the acquisition process. Tenets of the JCIDS 
are that it is a top-down requirements process within an 
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operational context and that requirements analysis is done 
in a joint context. The impetus for creation of the JCIDS 
was based on evidence that previously, when requirements 
analysis was performed at the Service level, Services 
developed Service-specific systems that were sometimes 
functionally redundant with other Services’ systems and 
sometimes were not interoperable with other Services’ 
systems. Previous to the JCIDS, requirements were also 
developed from the top, down, and consideration for Joint 
requirements is not new. However, then, as now, 
requirements were sometimes initiated by the Services from 
the bottom-up, based on operational need. The JCIDS, with a 
more rigorous, and Joint-led requirements analysis process, 
is intended to strengthen the top-down, Joint approach. 
To illustrate the difference between bottom up and top 
down requirements generation, in a bottom up system, a 
numbered Fleet Commander might, in response to recognized 
projections for adversary, quiet, diesel-electric 
submarines designed to operate in shallow water, identify a 
need for improved, surface anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
capability in the littorals. The appropriate Navy sponsor 
would consider that requirement, its cost to implement, and 
perhaps other expediencies, and decide whether to invest in 
a surface ship-based system or system upgrade to provide 
the improved ASW capability. If the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council (JROC) concurred with the requirement, 
the Navy would proceed with the requirement. Such a process 
might not have taken into account airborne ASW capability, 
projected operational environments and operational 
scenarios in the timeframe the capability would be fielded, 
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or whether other Services’ sensor capabilities (e.g. space-
based) might offer part of a solution. 
 
Figure 4 JCIDS; Preface to Acquisition, From Gonzales, 
2007. 
Top-down requirements approach, interrelationship of JCIDS 
and the acquisition process, and requirements artifacts are 
illustrated. 
 
The JCIDS is a top-down requirements process, starting 
at the National Security Strategy (2006) level, and flowing 
down to a required capability, from which a product 
requirement can be derived. In concert with this is a 
capabilities assessment component to allow comparison of 
current and projected capability relative to the proposed 
capability improvement. In essence, the JCIDS process 
interjects a requirements definition and validation 
component between the user and the developer that assesses 
and aligns all Services’ requirements, providing back to 
the Services a validated operational requirement from which 
product development can begin. The objectives are to find  
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the most efficient way to address an operational 
requirement and in the process, improve interoperability 
among the Services’ systems. 
C. RELATIONSHIP OF JCIDS TO THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
PROCESS 
Reviewing the JCIDS process as documented in CJCSI 
3170.01F (2007) and CJCSM 3170.01C (2007), and referenced 
in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2004), indicates 
activities and products of the JCIDS process map to the 
requirements analysis portion of the systems engineering 
process. Since there is implementation flexibility built 
into the JCIDS, Defense Acquisition, and systems 
engineering processes, it is not possible to precisely 
describe a singular, linear sequence or timing of events 
and products that would be appropriate in all cases. 
However, each of the processes is defined in terms of an 
overall series of phases whose intent is to ensure 
subsequent phase does not begin until prerequisite products 
from a preceding phase are complete. Figure 5 is a 
simplified, notionalized representation of acquisition, 
requirements, and systems engineering process alignment. 
This graphically illustrates the role and positioning of 
JCIDS in the systems engineering and acquisition processes. 
It also serves to illustrate that the DoD acquisition 
process is not the same as a systems engineering process 












Figure 5 Alignment of Acquisition, JCIDS, and Systems 
Engineering Processes 
These are the three, key, interrelated processes that play 
roles in the timing and development of system requirements.  
 
JCIDS products are based on analysis and outputs of 
Capability-Based Assessment (CBA) which in turn are 
supported by high-level, national, military, and joint 
guidance, policy, and data. A CBA is composed of Functional 
Area Analysis (FAA), Functional Needs Analysis (FNA), and 
Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA). These three components 
can be summarized respectively as providing answers to the 
three questions: What is the military problem to be 
studied? How well does DoD address the problem with its 
current program? What should the DoD do to address any 
shortfalls? (Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-8, 2006). The answers 
to these questions comprise a validated user need. 
Typically, an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) is 
developed based on results from the CBA. Per CJCSI 
3170.01F, 2007) an ICD: 
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Documents the requirement for a materiel or non-
materiel approach, or an approach that is a 
combination of materiel and non-materiel, to 
satisfy specific capability gap(s). It defines 
the capability gap(s) in terms of the functional 
area, the relevant range of military operations, 
desired effects, time and doctrine, organization, 
training, materiel, leadership and education, 
personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) and policy 
implications and constraints. The ICD summarizes 
the results of the DOTMLPF and policy analysis 
and the DOTMLPF approaches (materiel and non-
materiel) that may deliver the required 
capability. The outcome of an ICD could be one or 
more joint DCRs or capability development 
documents. (p. GL-9) 
Subsequently, additional requirements analysis and 
refinement leads to development of a Capability Development 
Document (CDD). The CDD defines authoritative, measurable, 
and testable capabilities as a prerequisite for a Milestone 
B (DoDI5000.02, 2008) decision allowing entry into the 
System Development and Demonstration (SDD) program phase. 
It provides the basis for development of a system design 
(CJCSM 3170.01C, 2007). 
The correlation of the CDD with the acquisition 
process’ SDD indexes the JCIDS process to the acquisition 
process. For the systems engineering process, logical index 
points could be the functional baseline or the allocated 
baseline, the points of initiation of preliminary design 
and detailed design respectively. This study proposes that 
the CDD could be indexed to either baseline or some 
intermediate point, depending on the nature of the 
requirement. For instance, many major DoN programs comprise 
upgrades to existing systems. For ship programs, cruiser 
modernization, i.e., “CG Modernization,” would be one 
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example. In this case, functional allocation, at least at 
the system or subsystem level, is preordained by the legacy 
architecture. For “new design” programs such as Zumwalt 
Class Destroyer, i.e., DDG-1000, a function such as 
survivability could be allocated during the SDD phase to 
(notionally) some combination of stealth technologies and 
the ability of the ship to maintain seaworthiness if struck 
by an adversary’s weapon. In the former case, the CDD would 
be indexed closer to the allocated baseline. In the latter 
case, the CDD would be indexed closer to the functional 
baseline. 
The Naval Systems Engineering Guide (2004) 
incorporates JCIDS’ activities and outputs into a systems 
engineering context. Three of the 33 normative processes 
adapted from ANSI/EIA-632 (1999), are the most pertinent to 
the JCIDS process. They are: “Acquirer Requirements,” 
“Other Stakeholder Requirements,” and “System Technical 
Requirements.” Details of inputs, activities, and outputs 
from those processes can be found in the Naval Systems 
Engineering Guide (2004).  
D. JCIDS AND INTEGRATED ARCHITECTURES 
Maier (2002) defines architecture as “The structure – 
in terms of components, connections, and constraints – of a 
product, process, or element.” The JCIDS process is 
intended to utilize integrated architectures (CJCSI 
3170.01F, 2007). The glossary in that document defines 
integrated architectures as “…consisting of multiple views 
or perspectives (operational view, systems view, and 
technical standards view) that facilitates integration and 
promotes interoperability across capabilities and among 
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related integrated architectures.” So really, the term 
integrated architectures refers to integration of views as 
opposed to two or more separate architectures that have 
been integrated into one architecture. The meaning of the 
different views, simply stated, is the operational view 
describes what a system does, the systems view describes 
how a system performs, and the technical view comprises 
applicable technical standards that constrain the solution. 
Overall, the JCIDS instruction does not suggest how 
integrated architectures should be used nor does it provide 
any guidance regarding the expected level of detail, or the 
information it might capture from the CBA or overarching 
strategic guidance that flows down to a Joint Integrating 
Concept (JIC), utilized in performing a CBA. 
CJCSM 3170.01C (2007), in its guidelines and 
procedures, both prescribes the use of existing 
architectures to support CBA’s and suggests results of the 
FSA can influence the future direction of integrated 
architectures. So, there is the implication of an evolution 
of integrated architectures that is interdependent with the 
requirements, i.e., JCIDS, process. 
To illustrate, architecture products specified by 
CJCSM 3170.01C (2007) as required for an ICD comprise OV-1 
and others if desired, while architecture products 
specified as required for a CDD include AV-1, OV-1, OV-2, 
OV-4, OV-5, OV-6C, SV-2, SV-4, SV-5, SV-6 and TV-1. These 
products are defined in the DoD Architecture Framework 
(2007). AV refers to All Views, OV refers to Operational 
Views, SV refers to System Views, and TV refers to 
Technical Views. OV’s correlate to operational 
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requirements, SV’s correlate to system requirements, and 
TV’s correlate to standards that constrain the design 
solution, e.g., industry standards for data interfaces. 
What is not explained in either JCIDS policy or the 
Naval Systems Engineering Guide (2004) is the manner in 
which architectures, as “a communication tool…presenting a 
common set of information with multiple views” (Richards, 
2007) can be used as a systems engineering tool, that is, 
the concept of using architectures to organize, analyze, 
and manage the data that comprises CBA inputs and outputs. 
The importance of capturing and preserving the data is 
recognized, but not the value of capturing and preserving 
the interrelationships of the data, an essential element of 
architectures. 
E. JCIDS IMPLEMENTATION INSIGHTS 
GAO Report GAO-08-1060, Defense Acquisitions; DoD’s 
Requirements Determination Process Has not Been Effective 
in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities (2008) concluded: “The 
JCIDS process has not yet met its objective to identify and 
prioritize warfighting needs from a joint capabilities 
perspective.” The report goes on to say DoD lacks an 
effective analytic framework to assess and prioritize 
warfighting needs. The GAO report further cited poor inter-
service coordination and inadequate resources applied to 
JCIDS analysis. The DoD partially concurred with the 
framework finding and concurred with the resourcing 
finding. Though use of architectures is not mentioned in 
the report, architectures can in fact constitute a 
framework for analysis, though the cross-domain, cross-
service architectural infrastructure currently in place is 
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not adequate to support such analysis. A recent Rand 
National Defense Institute Report (Gonzales, 2007) notes 
“…DoD uses a bottom-up architectural development process. 
This bottom-up approach can result in much duplication of 
effort across the entire acquisition system and thus make 
the development of a single, integrated architecture that 
summarizes DoD interoperability requirements difficult to 
achieve.” 
The 2007 Rand report (Gonzales, 2007) also offers two 
criticisms of JCIDS. First, it states that the JCIDS 
processes and products are described ambiguously as are 
their relationships with acquisition process products. 
While ambiguity is apparent in some of the descriptions of 
processes and products (e.g., one product being listed as 
both an input and an output of an activity), it is noted 
that the authors of the Rand paper, written at the 
direction of the DoN, did not acknowledge or reference the 
Naval Systems Engineering Guide (2004) or the CJCSI White 
Paper (White paper on CBA, 2006). The former places the 
JCIDS process in a systems engineering context, albeit not 
a systems acquisition context, and the latter provides 
significant insight on practical approaches to planning and 
executing JCIDS analysis, based on experience. The second 
criticism of the report (Gonzales, 2007) cites lack of 
formal traceability from the source of a user need through 
the JCIDS process to disposition. 
A report by the Institute for Defense Analysis 
(Hanley, 2006) was performed under contract to the 
Director, Force Structure and Resources (J8), the Joint 
Staff. The stated objective of the study documented by the 
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report was to produce an analytic framework for 
“capabilities-based planning” processes in the DoD. The 
stated premise was that there are multiple, capabilities-
based planning processes in use, JCIDS being one, that are 
not synchronized with one another. The report concludes 
with a series of recommendations, including “next steps” 
for taxonomies and data that notes a dichotomy between 
analytical and taxonomic breadth, agility, and stability, 
versus depth, complexity, and rigor. The report notes that 
ease of implementation and holistic analysis favors the 
former while analytical fidelity and valid insights favors 
the latter. The report presents no conclusion on the 
possibility of establishing a standardized capability 
taxonomy that could serve all needs of all stakeholders. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The JCIDS process, as incorporated into systems 
engineering processes described in the Naval Systems 
Engineering Guide (2004) offers the potential for a cross-
service requirements analysis and prioritization capability 
necessary to truly implement capability-based acquisition. 
It could also use architectures as an analytical and 
management framework. However, research for this study 
indicates the use of architectures in conjunction with 
JCIDS, while prescribed, is not really explained in policy 
or guidance, and to date, the Services’ approaches to 
warfighting requirements continue to align to Service 
perspective rather than a Joint perspective. 
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IV. DOD ARCHITECTURE FRAMEWORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To define “architecture framework” first requires 
differentiation of the term “architectures” from the term 
“frameworks.” An architecture does not require a framework. 
The definition of “architecture” cited in the DoD 
Architecture Framework Version 1.5 (2007) is: “the 
structure of components, their relationships, and the 
principles and guidelines governing their design and 
evolution over time.” Every existing system embodies an 
architecture yet relatively few architectures of existing 
systems were developed using an architecture framework. 
Conversely, the term “frameworks” need not be related to 
architectures as is evident from Webster’s II Dictionary 
(1984) definition of the term: “a basic arrangement, form, 
or system.” Rolf Siegers (2005) defined architecture 
framework simply as “a resource that aids in the 
development or description of an architecture.” Maier 
(2004) asserts that an architecture framework exhibits one 
or more of the following five characteristics: 
1. A definition of the word “architecture” 
2. A conceptual framework explaining key concepts or 
terms 
3. An approach to describing architectures 
4. Architectural methods (e.g., creating, analyzing, 
interpreting, realizing) 
5. A theory of how architectures and architectural 
descriptions fit into a larger context (e.g., 
systems engineering, design, etc.) 
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Motivation to establish and implement architecture 
frameworks can be characterized as either driven by 
business considerations, technical considerations, or both. 
An architecture framework used for enterprise product 
development can for example facilitate shorter product 
development cycles, lower manufacturing, support and 
upgrade costs, and a reduced number of functionally 
duplicative products. This can be explained by a 
framework’s ability to make individual product 
architectures comparable and integrable, facilitating 
cross-product insights that would be difficult otherwise. 
From a technical perspective, and for the same reasons 
cited in the business perspective, products developed in 
conformance with an architecture which is in turn developed 
in conformance with an architecture framework potentially 
exhibit a greater degree of interoperability, a simpler 
logistics support infrastructure, and in systems of 
systems, a greater ability to be reconfigured to adapt to 
changes in mission needs. The DoD architecture framework 
(2007) underlies DoD requirements, acquisition, and systems 
engineering policy and guidance for both business and 
technical reasons. 
B. ORIGINS OF THE DOD ARCHITECTURE FRAMEWORK 
According to a GAO report on Defense information 
superiority, (1998) the DoD, as a result of communication 
interoperability problems during the Viet Nam War, has been 
trying since 1967 to establish some form of Department-wide 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture. In 
the intervening years through the early 1990’s, efforts to 
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establish architecture frameworks for C4ISR continued, but 
primarily at the Service level with the expectation but not 
the requisite management structure that Joint 
interoperability would follow. Continuing interoperability 
issues during operations Urgent Fury, (Grenada, 1982), Just 
Cause, (Panama, 1989-90), and Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
(Kuwait, 1991) led to a concept documented in the Joint 
Staff paper “C4I for the Warrior” (1992) and endorsed by 
then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Colin Powell. The paper 
laid out near-term, mid-term, and long-term plans and 
objectives to provide the battlefield commander “access to 
all information needed to win in war…when, where, and how 
he wants it.” The paper did not explicitly call for a DoD 
architecture framework but discussion of utilizing “common 
information exchange standards” and “migration from unique 
military standards to commercial national and international 
standards” showed intent to at least establish a standards-
based framework. 
The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) in 
October 1991 issued a set of Adopted Information Technology 
Standards (AITS) as the DoD Technical Architecture 
Framework (TAFIM) for Information Management, a technical 
i.e., standards-based, architecture framework. The TAFIM 
was in turn based on a National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) product called the “Application 
Portability Profile” (DoD Technical Architecture Framework, 
1994). The Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) supplanted 
the TAFIM which was cancelled in January, 2000. The JTA has 
since been replaced by the current DoD IT Standards 
Registry (DISR). 
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The Deputy Secretary of Defense in October, 1995 
directed an effort to improve processes to ensure adequate, 
Joint C4I for warfighters. Under the direction of ASD(C3I) 
the C4ISR Integrated Task Force was established, and 
subordinate to the task force was the Integrated 
Architectures Panel. That group undertook the task of 
establishing an architecture framework based on three 
architectural views: operational, systems, and technical. 
The group incorporated substantial content from previous 
and ongoing Joint and Service architecture efforts such as 
TAFIM. The panel’s product, the C4ISR Architecture 
Framework, Version 1.0, was approved on 7 June 1996. 
Shortly thereafter, the C4ISR Architecture Working Group 
was established to continue and build upon the work begun 
by the Integrated Architecture Panel. The resulting product 
was Version 2.0 of the C4ISR Architecture Framework, 
approved on 18 December 1997. 
C. EVOLUTION TO THE DOD ARCHITECTURE FRAMEWORK 
The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 was intended to improve 
acquisition management of Government Information Technology 
(IT) systems. It established the term “National Security 
System” to mean essentially IT-related defense systems, and 
waived many of the provisions of the act for National 
Security Systems. However, it did require establishment of 
an Information Technology Architecture for National 
Security Systems and responsibility for that was assigned 
to the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO). The term 
“National Security System” was significantly more inclusive 
than the term C4ISR. From this grew the more broadly-scoped 
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DoD Architecture Framework, using Version 2.0 of the DoD 
C4ISR Architecture Framework as a basis. 
Under the auspices of the DoD Architecture Framework 
Working Group, DoD Architecture Framework Version 1.0 was 
approved on 15 August 2003. Significant changes relative to 
DoD C4ISR Architecture Framework Version 2.0 included: 
• Guidance provided to tailor product selection 
based on the intended use of the architecture. 
• Greater emphasis on the architecture data rather 
than just architecture products. 
• Content (techniques, processes, and examples) was 
added to provide some explanation of architecture 
development and use. 
A revised DoD Architecture Framework, Version 1.5, was 
approved on 23 April 2007. The Version 1.5 document notes 
among significant changes, more emphasis on architecture 
data rather than architecture products, introduction of the 
concept of federated architectures, and incorporation of 
the Core Architecture Data Model (CADM) as an integral 
component of the DoDAF. It is noted that Version 1.0 of the 
framework also asserted greater emphasis on architectural 
data and also presented CADM as “the DoD standard 
architecture data model for Framework-based architecture 
data elements” (DoDAF Version 1.0, 2003) though in that 
version, CADM compliance was not directive. This may be 
explained by the fact that at the time of Version 1.0 
issuance, the Defense Architecture Repository (DAR) which 
requires CADM compliance, was still under development. 
D. REQUIREMENTS TO USE THE DODAF 
DoD policy, which requires use of integrated 
architectures, flows down to DoN policy. In DoDD 5000.1 
 40
(2003), integrated architectures are mentioned only in the 
context of ensuring interoperability requirements are met. 
There is no direct citation of the DoDAF as a reference or 
requirement. DoDI 5000.2 (2008) also does not directly cite 
the DoDAF as a reference or requirement. DoD 5000.2 (2008) 
does stipulate “…The capability needs and acquisition 
management systems shall use…integrated architectures…in an 
integrated, collaborative process to define needed 
capabilities to guide the development of affordable 
systems” It further stipulates operational, systems, and 
technical views, and the use of the DISR for selection of 
standards. The primary emphasis regarding use of 
architectures is on requirements validation and 
interoperability, not as a vehicle for translating user 
needs into system requirements. 
SECNAVINST 5000.2D (2008) notes that the Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook (DAG 2004) provides “…best practices 
and lessons learned…” to augment DoDI 5000.2 (2008). 
However, Chapter 4 of the guidebook, “Systems Engineering” 
is silent on the use of integrated architectures and does 
not list the DoDAF as a resource. Chapter 7 of the 
guidebook “Acquiring Information Technology and National 
Security Systems” does address the development and use of 
DoDAF-compliant, integrated architectures and cites 
specific architecture products required by policy. However, 
the focus of Chapter 7 is on successful development of net-
centric systems. While net-centricity is a highly valued 
attribute of emergent warfare systems, it is only one facet 
of the overall set of requirements and therefore represents 
only a portion of the requirements analysis process. 
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DoDD 4630.5 (2004), Interoperability and 
Supportability of Information Technology (IT) and National 
Security Systems (NSS) and DoDI 4630.8 (2004), Procedures 
for Interoperability and Supportability of Information 
Technology (IT) and National Security Systems (NSS) provide 
specific direction with regard to the development and use 
of integrated architectures. DoDI 4630.8 (2004) notes 
“Integrated architectures are the common foundation for 
capability-focused, effects-based IT and NSS 
interoperability and supportability processes…”. 
SECNAV Instruction 5000.2D (2008) says about 
integrated architectures: “All DoN new start IT systems, 
including NSS, that exchange information with external 
systems shall comply with NR KPP (Net Ready Key Performance 
Parameters) and FORCEnet integrated architecture and other 
elements of the FORCEnet Consolidated Compliance Checklist 
(FCCC) guide as described by the CDD at program 
initiation,” i.e., normally Milestone B. The Net-ready KPP 
stipulation requires production of specific DoDAF-compliant 
architecture products. The document also stipulates use of 
a Systems Engineering Plan (SEP) and references OSD SEP 
preparation guide, Version 2.01 (2008). SECNAVINST 5000.2D 
(2008) states “SEP shall address development of a systems 
architecture using the DoDAF, the FORCEnet integrated 
architecture, and the Naval open architecture.” 
The Naval Systems Engineering Guide (2004), based on 
EIA 632 (1999), does not directly specify development or 
use of DoDAF architecture products, though by inclusion of 
the JCIDS process in the systems engineering process, ICDs, 
CDDs and CPDs are included and so, by extension, are DoDAF 
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architecture products. The Naval Systems Engineering Guide 
(2006) takes a holistic, DOTMLPF, i.e., doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 
personnel, and facilities, perspective to systems 
engineering. Interoperability requirements are not singled 
out from the rest of systems engineering considerations as 
they are in other DoD and DoN policy and guidance 
previously discussed in this chapter. 
E. DEMONSTRATED UTILITY AND VALUE OF DODAF 
This section reviews and analyzes literature that 
explains and summarizes application of the DoDAF and the 
insights it provides or decisions it supports. It also 
provides some overall characterization of the use of the 
DoDAF, the reported benefits and shortcomings in content or 
application, and the means by which practitioners have been 
able to improve application of the DoDAF or the value it 
provides. A substantial, systems engineering literature 
search from five years ago to the present, and a selective 
search of the last 10 years, did not identify significant 
“case study” type literature reporting DoDAF successes. 
This might be construed as evidence that among systems 
engineering researchers and practitioners DoDAF success 
stories are not widespread. A success story for the 
purposes of this study would be defined as implementation 
of DoDAF that results in improvement of the systems 
engineering process, measureable in terms of cost or 
schedule improvement or risk mitigation to a degree that 
more than offsets the cost and time required to develop, 
maintain, and utilize a DoDAF-compliant architecture. 
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Although significant literature addressing specific 
DODAF use and effectiveness was not found, a Microsoft 
PowerPoint presentation from an OASD, NII-sponsored, 
Government, DoD, and industry-wide survey (OASD (NII) 
Architecture Survey, 2005) was found that characterized 
DoDAF architecture usage in general, and summarized survey 
comments pertaining to specific instances of DoDAF 
application and the consequent value accrued. There were 
120 respondents. Demographics of DoD architects were 
presented, types of decisions enabled by DoDAF 
architectures were identified, and DoDAF strengths, 
weaknesses, and suggestions for improvement were presented. 
A review of salient insights from that survey offers 
insight on the “state of the practice” and practitioners’ 
beliefs of the value of DoDAF architectures. 
Almost half of the architects were contractors, i.e., 
performing architecture work in support of Government 
customers or Government contracts, half had one-to-five 
years experience, and almost half worked on teams of one to 
five. The most frequently used training source was tool 
vendors, i.e., tools in the sense of software supporting 
documentation and development of architectures. The 
predominance of contractors as architects, the relative 
inexperience of architects, and the bias toward small 
architecture teams may be indicative of lack of commitment 
to architecture development and use at the program level by 
the Government, and a tendency for architects to learn how 
to develop architectures through their own experience 
instead of building on a knowledge base of others’ 
experience. 
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Respondents represented 53 organizations and over 80 
architecture projects. Almost 75% of respondents used 
Telelogic’s “System Architect” tool. Telelogic’s web site 
indicates more than 1000 commercial, government and 
military users of their software product line world-wide. 
The software product line includes System Architect as well 
as other engineering tools. These figures lie in contrast 
to the scarcity of case study literature. The numbers in 
fact indicate architecture development is being conducted 
on a fairly broad scale. One explanation of this contrast 
is that development of DoDAF architecture products is 
mandated for most DoD programs, yet they are often 
developed in isolation of the system engineering process, 
undermining much of the potential value of architectures 
and therefore explaining why “success stories” are hard to 
find. The survey did not address what the effect might be 
if DoDAF architectures were developed solely at the 
discretion of a program manager or chief systems engineer. 
Some of the most interesting survey data derives from 
answers to open-ended questions. Three questions in 
particular provide insight on architects’ beliefs of the 
utility and value of architectures: 
 
• What values, Benefits, and Impacts are 
attributable to their organization’s Use of 
Architectures? 
• What decisions are expected to be made based on 
architecture analysis? 
• What are your architecture Successes; where 
architectures made a difference? 
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In the context of the survey, key among listed values, 
benefits, and impacts were: “Common frame of reference for 
all manner of discussions and decision-making” and 
“Supports decision-making and identification of issues.” 
Both of those benefits correlate to the use of 
architectures during the requirements definition process. 
Among expected decisions supported, “…negotiate MOAs (i.e., 
Memoranda Of Agreement) and communicated requirements with 
contractors and users” and “Identify capability gaps…report 
capabilities based on requirements…prioritize projects” are 
germane to this study. Some of the most significant, 
architectural successes listed were those asserting that 
architectures provided objective justification for initial 
or continuation of funding for a project or program. That 
suggests use of architectures to support the requirements 
definition process, consistent with the intent of the JCIDS 
process. 
Survey respondents commented on DoDAF strengths and 
weaknesses. Themes expressed in “strengths” were maturity, 
wide acceptance as a standard, and the consequent ability 
to compare and analyze architectures on a common basis. 
Weaknesses expressed concerned both development and use of 
architectures. With regard to development, there was 
concern that in spite of the standardized structure of 
DoDAF, there was too much variability in lexicon, taxonomy, 
metadata and other attributes to allow integration or 
comparison of architectures, above-mentioned strengths 
notwithstanding. There was also concern that architectures 
were not capability-focused, in other words, not inclusive 
of the breadth of DOTMLPF. Finally, among significant 
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weaknesses listed was lack of clear guidance and policy for 
what to do with architectures that have been developed. 
Russell (2005) notes: 
…the output of most architecture efforts tends to 
be a three ring binder that weighs five pounds or 
so which no one ever reads. This has given a bad 
name to the architecting process and has left 
many decision makers asking why they spent their 
limited money and time producing architectures. 
F. NEXT STEPS IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE DODAF 
Update of the DoDAF to Version 2.0 is being managed by 
the Architecture and Interoperability Directorate, under 
the Office of the DoD CIO. The organizational structure, as 
presented by Mr. Brian Wilcynski of the DoD CIO is shown in 
Figure 6 (Wilcynski, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 6 DoDAF Development Organizational Structure, From 
Wilcynski, 2007. 
Development of this update to DoDAF Version 1.5 is ongoing. 
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The vision statement for the DoDAF 2.0 is: “To enable 
the development of architectures that are meaningful, 
useful, and relevant to the DoD Requirements, Planning, 
Budgeting, Systems Engineering, and Acquisition decision 
processes” (Wilcynski, 2007). The stated (Wilcynski, 2007), 
high-level areas of focus are: 
• Focus on information requirements versus products 
as in previous versions 
• Be driven by decision process requirements 
• Support DoD shift to service orientation of 
architectures 
• Support a federated enterprise architecture 
approach 
In terms of scope, six DoD processes the DoDAF is 
intended to support are: JCIDS, Systems Engineering, 
Operations, Portfolio Management, Program, Planning, 
Budgeting, and Execution, and Defense Acquisition System. 
As of April, 2008, requirements-gathering workshops had 
been conducted in support of the first three of those 
processes. 
Publication of the DoDAF Version 2.0 is expected 
before the end of Fiscal Year 2009. During development, a 
series of plenary sessions is being held to keep the 
architecture community in general apprized, and to solicit 
feedback and comments. Briefs are provided at the working 
group level: Data, Method, and Presentation, as shown in 
Figure 5. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In the introduction of this chapter, reference was 
made to five attributes that could be used to characterize 
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an architecture framework: An architecture definition, key 
terms, an approach for describing architectures, 
architectural methods, and where architectures fit in a 
larger context (Maier, 2004). From the first standards-
based framework through the in-development DoDAF Version 
2.0, those attributes capture both the intent of framework 
development efforts and the continuing shortfalls. By 
virtue of the fact that DoDAF use is embedded in DoN policy 
and guidance, it is the standard for architectures in DoN. 
However, considerable variation in DoDAF architecture 
implementation is evident within the boundaries of DoDAF 
compliance, such that architectures for different but 
related systems in many cases cannot be effectively 
compared or integrated. The current framework is necessary 
but not sufficient to ensure the effective use of 
architectures in acquisition and systems engineering. The 
DoDAF Version 2.0 is intended to address some long-standing 
shortcomings, but the framework is only one part of what 
should be a multi-faceted approach to realizing the 




V. INTEGRATING KEY PROCESSES WITH THE OVERALL 
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Previous chapters discussed the systems engineering 
process, the DoD requirements process, i.e., JCIDS, the DoD 
architecture framework, and to a limited extent, the DoD 
acquisition process. These processes in effect constitute a 
complex system-of-systems. The objective of this study is 
to examine the portions of the processes that relate to 
translation of user needs to a comprehensive, unambiguous, 
verifiable set of system requirements. This chapter 
identifies the critical components for successful 
requirements translation in a systems engineering context, 
the necessary elements of a good system specification, and 
considers how best to integrate necessary process 
components that lie both inside and outside DoD systems 
engineering process. Weaknesses in the current processes 
and recommendations for improvement are identified and 
involve both technical and managerial components. This 
study is primarily focused on the technical aspect, though 
key, high level management issues are recognized. 
B. TRANSLATING USER NEEDS TO SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
In its simplest form, a user need can be expressed in 
a single requirement that embodies a set of requirements 
clearly understood by the person receiving the requirement. 
For example, if someone asks “Do you have a pencil I can 
borrow?” that is an easily understood user need. The user 
needs a pencil. Not stated, but understood with a 
reasonable degree of certainty are the following: The user 
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wants a pencil with a point on it, i.e., not broken. The 
user wishes to use the pencil for some task and at the 
completion of the task, will return the pencil. The user 
does not particularly care whether the pencil is a 
mechanical or “wooden” pencil. Does that leave any 
uncertainty? Yes. Maybe the receiver of the request has 
only a red marking pencil. In all likelihood, that person 
will say “I’ve only got a red pencil. Is that OK?” At that 
point, there has been a statement of user need and the 
“developer” has communicated back to develop a more precise 
understanding of the need. After all, the user may have 
wanted a pencil only to scratch a spot in the middle of his 
back, in which case the type of pencil and whether it had a 
point is inconsequential. Nonetheless, “user” and 
“developer” must communicate to ensure the product 
satisfies the need. Communication must be in clear and 
unambiguous terms. The developer either identifies a 
solution that fully satisfies the user need, or a solution 
is negotiated that provides a lesser, but acceptable 
solution, or, the developer indicates there is no feasible 
solution, i.e., no pencil or other implement of inscription 
is available. 
If the object of the example is changed from a pencil 
to $500, immediately the requirements definition and 
feasibility of a solution become more complex. How long 
will the loan be for? Will it be interest-free? Can the 
“user” be depended on to pay off the loan? Maybe the user 
really doesn’t need $500 but is simply unaware of other 
means of financing that would not require a large down-
payment. Maybe the intended use of the money is an 
important factor. Is the money to pay for medicine for a 
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sick child or to bet on horse-racing? Communications with 
the user might break down if the user and developer cannot 
reach a common understanding of the need. Thus, even this 
trivial example can easily be made complex. 
The previous example, though trivial in comparison 
with typical DoN warfighting requirements, still embodies 
some important principles and concepts. The user need can 
usually be expressed singularly or in a very small number 
of statements. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Roughead’s 
CNO Guidance (Roughead, 2008) at the top level, is simply: 
“Build the Future Force, Maintain Warfighting Readiness, 
and Develop and Support our Sailors, Navy Civilians, and 
Families.” That is the CNO’s requirement. 
The rest of the Navy’s operational requirements are 
subordinate and should be traceable, noting that as 
requirements are flowed down from the CNO guidance level to 
the system requirement level, complexity increases by 
orders of magnitude. Only in trivial cases will a statement 
of user need be sufficiently comprehensive and complete to 
fully define system requirements and establish a basis for 
product development. As stated in Systems Engineering and 
Analysis (Blanchard, 2006): 
Accomplishing the needs analysis in a 
satisfactory manner can best be realized through 
a team approach involving the customer, the 
ultimate consumer or user (if different from the 
customer), the prime contractor or producer, and 
major suppliers, as appropriate. The objective is 
to ensure that the proper communications exist 
between all parties involved in the process; 
i.e., the ‘voice of the customer’ must be heard, 
and the system developer(s) must respond 
accordingly. 
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There is a well-known and accepted systems engineering 
model first documented in the U.S. by Forsberg and Mooz in 
1991 (Forsberg, 1991), referred to as the “Vee” model, 
shown in Figure 7. The process starts at the upper left 
hand leg of the vee with “understanding customer 
requirements” and progresses downward toward the bottom of 
the vee through a process of decomposition and definition 
from which system synthesis can begin. However, there can 
be a step in the system engineering process that precedes 
the beginning of the “Vee” model and is a process of 
composition rather than decomposition. 
 
Figure 7 Engineering Vee Model, From Blanchard, 2006. 
System requirement development is a process of 
decomposition. Synthesis of a solution is a process of 
composition. The “Vee” Model illustrates the progressively 
more detailed system requirements followed by the 




Mr. Michael Collins, president of Advantage 
Development, Inc., in a presentation to the NDIA (Collins, 
2008), asserted that engineering requires an “initial 
point,” defined by him as “Engineerable Requirements: the 
set of engineering requirements necessary and sufficient to 
initiate the successful engineering and production of the 
system.” He further argues that architecting is a means of 
forming separate elements into a “coherent whole” that can 
serve as that initial point. The concept of needs analysis 
through a team-based series of communications described by 
Blanchard (2006) can be combined with the architecture 
process mentioned above to create a more rigorous, 
assessable process to derive a set of system requirements 
that tightly coupled to stated user needs. 
The fundamental concept of translating user needs to 
developer’s requirements, as well as where this step lies 
in an overall systems engineering model have been 
considered to this point at a high level of abstraction. In 
order to characterize an actionable process however, more 
detail is needed. For example: How are stakeholders 
identified? How are user needs captured in a logical, 
consistent manner? How is it known when this step is 
complete and correct? How is this most critical step 
performed with rigor and discipline? Recent systems 
engineering literature offers some answers to these 
questions. Bahill (1997) presents an overview of what he 
terms the “requirements discovery process.” He asserts 
“…there is a uniform and identifiable process for logically 
discovering the system requirements regardless of system 
purpose, size, or complexity,” and credits that belief to 
other authors. The steps (Bahill 97) identifies are: 
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Identify Customers and Stakeholders 
1. Understand the Customer’s Needs 
2. Define and State the Problem 
3. Write System Requirements 
4. Review Requirements with Customer 
5. Define Figures of Merit 
6. Validate System Requirements 
7. Verify Requirements 
8. Identify Technical Performance Measures (i.e., 
Key Performance Parameters in DoD parlance) 
9. Continue to review requirements with the customer 
throughout the development process. 
 
This study is primarily concerned with steps “1” 
through “7.” The first step, identifying customers and 
stakeholders, is sometimes discussed superficially in 
general systems engineering texts, simply saying it is very 
important. The terms “customer” and “stakeholder” are 
closely related. Bahill (1997) defines a customer as 
“…anyone who has a right to impose requirements on a 
system.” Carson (2004) defines a stakeholder as “…anyone or 
any organization involved with or affected by the system 
lifecycle…”. The group defined by the former, more 
restrictive definition can be considered a subset of the 
group defined by the latter definition. That is, all who 
have a right to impose requirements on a system presumably 
are affected by the system, but not all those who are 
affected by the system have a right to impose requirements. 
To illustrate, consider in light of Bahill’s (1997) 
definition of customer, the following example of a failed 
system from Bahill (2005): Management at Ford in the 1950’s 
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overrode marketing recommendations and imposed requirements 
resulting in the Edsel automobile, an automobile without a 
market, and therefore a failed design. By Bahill’s 
definition, management acted as a customer while marketing 
did not. Management withheld from marketing the right to 
impose requirements, leaving marketing as a stakeholder but 
not a customer. Management failed to recognize marketing’s 
role as a representative for the end customer, those who 
would or would not buy the automobile. Next, consider 
Carson’s (2004) definition of stakeholder. He specifically 
identifies and includes “nature” and those not allowed to 
approve requirements as stakeholders. Those categories 
would not fit Bahill’s customer definition, but Carson is 
suggesting those members of the larger stakeholder set 
should be treated as customers; their requirements should 
be considered. In his view, someone must play the role of 
spokesperson for those stakeholders. 
An example of failure to engage stakeholders was 
evident in a 2001 FBI project, a three year development 
contract to upgrade the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
(FBI’s) IT infrastructure and to design what was called the 
“Virtual Case File” which would allow the FBI to move from 
its antiquated paper-based investigation and records to 
computer-based investigation and records. A National 
Research Council letter report (McGroddy, 2004) provided a 
status of the project and concluded in part: "In essence, 
the FBI has left the task of defining and identifying its 
essential operational processes and its IT concept of 
operations to outsiders." The software-based system lacked 
some essential capabilities. It appeared that among other 
issues the FBI used contractors as FBI stakeholders, not 
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agency stakeholders themselves. The system developer in 
turn may not have exercised due diligence in validating the 
requirements. The program, nominally a $170M program, was 
cancelled and begun over with a new development contractor, 
eventually costing an additional two times the original 
program cost. 
Carson (2004) suggests identifying stakeholders 
through a process of examining the system in its 
environment through all parts of its life cycle, 
development to disposal. For U.S. Navy warfare systems, it 
should be possible to establish a standard “menu” of 
stakeholders, though consideration should be given to any 
possible emergent stakeholders, particularly in the public 
domain. For instance, a requirement for a nuclear power 
plant on a ship will affect where a ship can be home-
ported. The community adjacent to the proposed home port 
becomes a stakeholder. Or, if it was known that a ship 
would ultimately become an artificial reef (i.e. wildlife 
management or tourism stakeholder), consideration might be 
given in its design to ease its preparation for that final 
role. The associated state department of natural resources 
might be a stakeholder. 
The developer’s understanding of customer needs is 
also critical and depends on effective, iterative, 
communication between customer and developer utilizing 
commonly agreed-upon semantics. This process of 
communication, translation, and negotiation merits further 
discussion. One component of the process is establishing a 
framework of requirements, e.g., hierarchy and categories. 
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Among the ways to categorize requirements, one is 
differentiating functional requirements from non-functional 
requirements. Functional requirements represent something 
the system must do. Non-functional requirements typically 
represent how well the system must do something. Among non-
functional requirements, some pertain to one or a limited 
number of functions and others are overarching, such as 
satisfying operator safety standards. 
There are several, well-documented methods of 
capturing user requirements in a manner that provides some 
assurance of completeness and correctness; Carson, (2004) 
summarizes them. They include checklist approaches, Quality 
Function Deployment-type approaches, use case and other 
functional analysis, series of reviews, and “context 
analysis,” the primary topic of that paper. Each has 
strengths and weaknesses and each is likely to be 
effective, depending on the application. One method stands 
out as being fundamentally different: Use cases. Use cases 
have the ability to capture the required functional 
behavior of a system; the other methods generally result in 
“shall” statements.” Defining required behavior with “shall 
statements” can be cumbersome and lacking in context. 
However, use cases alone will not capture all requirements. 
Daniels (2005) has suggested a hybrid approach that 
augments use cases to provide a comprehensive set of 
requirements, and uses shall-type (i.e., plain language) 
requirements to add detail missing from use cases. 
The hybrid approach appears both sound and robust, 
giving consideration to both the effective communication 
element of translating user needs into system requirements 
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as well as the need for comprehensive requirements that 
capture the required behavior of a system, i.e., what the 
system has to do under conditions of use. Furthermore, this 
approach supports the use of architectures as a vehicle to 
communicate and reconcile user needs into system 
requirements. Daniels (2005) recognizes both the need for 
capturing a complex set of requirements in its entirety, as 
well as communicating requirements between user and 
developer in terms both understand. That is a strength of 
architectures, when applied properly. Cole (2006) asserts: 
The complexity of the SoS environment makes it 
difficult (if not impossible) to describe the 
problem with requirements alone. Architectures is 
a critical aspect of describing the problem, 
especially when user needs, technologies, 
organizational dynamics and external interfaces 
are continuously changing. 
Cole (2006) focuses on the system engineering 
complexities that accompany systems-of-systems (SoS) 
development. While SoS is not the focus of this study, 
practically all non-trivial, Naval warfare system, systems 
engineering problems are SoS problems. In other words, U.S. 
Navy warfare systems are rarely standalone systems. They 
are part of or directly interact with other systems. 
Operational and systems architectures are implicit if not 
explicit. 
Schindel (2005) discusses requirements statements as 
transfer functions and describes the necessary roles of 
“requirements prose” engineering models in describing 
complex systems, again reinforcing the idea that models, 
i.e., architectures, and prose, i.e., shall statements, 
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must be used together to describe a set of requirements and 
communicate those requirements between user and developer. 
Referring back to Bahill’s (1997) 10 steps to 
translate user needs into system requirements, the last six 
steps all contribute to ensuring completeness and 
correctness of the requirements. Discussion to this point 
has focused on requirements capture, essentially the first 
four steps, recognizing opportunities exist after that 
point to update or correct requirements. Determination of 
requirements completeness and correctness is the objective 
of validation and verification processes. Bahill (1997) 
described validation as ensuring requirements are 
consistent with one another, that a feasible solution 
exists, and that it can be demonstrated that the system 
fulfills its requirements. He describes requirements 
verification as determination that a requirement has been 
met, using testing, examination, or analytical methods. 
Requirements validation and verification are necessary but 
may not be sufficient to ensure requirements completeness. 
Validation and verification processes operate only on those 
requirements that have been recorded. Although validation 
and verification may lead to discovery of “missing” 
requirements, it is not assured. 
Procedures exist to review requirements for 
completeness and correctness. Carson’s (2004) objective was 
to “Develop and validate a methodology that can produce a 
complete set of requirements and that can determine the 
completeness of a set of requirements.” Note that in this 
case, completeness is defined to include correctness. That 
is, if requirements are complete, they are correct. Carson 
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(2004) cites Mar (1994) when listing the following five 
characteristics of requirements completeness. Mar (1994) 
notes that among those five, numbers “1” and “3” are 
hardest to ensure: 
 
1. All categories of requirements are addressed 
2. All impositions of higher level requirements are 
accounted for 
3. All scenarios and states are recognized and 
described 
4. All assumptions are documented 
5. Requirements are understandable and unambiguous 
 
Carson (2004) also identifies two requirements cases: 
Those that do not inherit higher level requirements and 
those for which a complete set of requirements can be 
derived from higher level requirements. Typically, Naval 
warfare system requirements represent a third, hybrid case. 
In all cases there will be higher level requirements 
levied, but some higher level requirements cannot be 
decomposed or allocated in such a way that all lower level 
requirements can be unambiguously shown to support the 
higher level requirement. This precludes the use of 
allocation and traceability for determining completeness. 
For example, a ship’s signature, e.g., radar, acoustic, IR, 
etc., a ship’s electronic countermeasure capability, a 
ship’s ability to withstand weapon strikes, and a ship’s 
missile and torpedo weaponry all affect a ship’s self-
defense capability. But, even at the “ship self-defense” 
level of abstraction, it may not be possible to 
quantitatively trace lower level requirements upward due to 
limitations in modeling. In this case, determination of 
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requirements completeness may have to be conducted in the 
manner the manner of Carson’s (2004) first case; as if 
higher level requirements are not inherited. 
Carson (2004) focuses on the instance where higher 
level requirements are not inherited and suggests a set of 
requirements is complete if all stakeholders approve the 
requirements. His assertion is if all stakeholders are 
identified, approval of the requirements assures 
requirements completeness. This leads back to the issue of 
communication and understanding. What constitutes a 
stakeholder review? How can a stakeholder be assured his 
judgment to approve a set of requirements is well-founded? 
Carson offers a “formal approach to completeness,” the 
details of which are beyond the scope of this study. 
However it is important to note this approach incorporates 
requirements modeling and requirements prose as previously 
discussed. His approach also adds the stipulation that 
pragmatically, only a subset of the entirety of 
combinations of interface behavior and conditions can be 
analyzed. Those sets of conditions that do not affect 
required behavior are set aside. 
Thus, an argument is made that for Naval Warfare 
systems, methods exist to translate user needs to system 
requirements utilizing models requirements and architecture 
models and plain language, and, that methods exist to 
ascertain completeness of system requirements. The 
scalability of this approach has not been shown and the 
specific models or the basis for selecting models has not 
been addressed. There have been instances where modeling of 
requirements was used to generate prose requirements, 
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therefore assuring consistency between the two. Next, this 
hybrid, model and prose type of approach will be compared 
with DoD and DoN policy and guidance to determine the 
viability, practicality, and issues that would be 
associated with employing this approach in a DoN context. 
C. TRANSLATION OF USER NEEDS IN THE CONTEXT OF DON POLICY 
AND GUIDANCE 
In the previous section, a high-level procedural basis 
for translating user needs into a complete set of system 
requirements was described. Requirements completeness 
across the DOTMLPF spectrum, analytical rigor, and 
effective communications between the user and the developer 
were emphasized. In this section, the JCIDS process and the 
DoN requirements definition process (Naval Systems 
Engineering Guide, 2004) are examined to assess the extent 
to which they facilitate translation of user need to system 
requirements in the manner described in the previous 
section. 
A complete statement of user need should contain, or 
reference, the following: 
 
1. Traceability of the user need to higher level 
requirements (e.g., CNO guidance) and Joint 
warfighting taxonomy (i.e. JOCs). 
2. Definition of concept of operation for the system 
3. Operational conditions for the system; 
environmental, threat, and other 
4. Definition of the architecture within which the 
system must operate. 
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Functional Area Analysis (FAA), part of the JCIDS 
Capability-Based Assessment, is described in CJCSM 3170.01B 
(2007) in the following manner: 
… identifies the mission area or military problem 
to be assessed, the concepts to be examined, the 
timeframe in which the problem is being assessed, 
and the scope of the assessment. …The FAA 
describes the relevant objectives and CONOPs or 
concepts, and lists the relevant effects to be 
generated. Since a capability is the ability to 
generate an effect, the FAA connects capabilities 
to the defense strategy via objectives, concepts, 
and CONOPs. 
The White Paper on CBA (2006) also notes the 
importance of scenario selection as part of the Capability 
Based Assessment (CBA) to provide a range of enemies, 
environments, and access challenges. Therefore, FAA 
addresses high-level requirements traceability, CONOPS and 
operational conditions, but not architecture. 
Subsequently, Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) and 
Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA) assess current 
capabilities, determine whether gaps exist, and develop 
potential approaches to resolve identified capability gaps. 
The White Paper on CBA (2006) notes in reference to the 
entirety of JCIDS analysis: 
Architectures are useful (and probably essential) 
once you have decided what to do, as they provide 
a framework to help determine how to do it. JCIDS 
capability assessments, however, tend to be 
concerned more with what to do… 
This statement is inconsistent with a statement made 
later in the same document: “Your statement of needs has to 
be tempered by rough feasibility, cost, and schedule 
estimates, and you have to have some idea of what the DoD 
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is willing to tolerate for additional investments in your 
areas.” This statement indirectly suggests architectures 
are needed during the JCIDS process, as they provide 
constraints, conditions, interfaces and other information 
that are important in the development of feasible, 
potential approaches to address capability gaps. 
Following the statement of user need, effective, 
iterative communication between the user and developer is 
needed to successfully evolve the user need into a compete 
set of system requirements. The next consideration then, is 
whether the JCIDS process facilitates this dialog, taking 
into account the volume and complexity of the information 
being exchanged and the differences between user and 
developer lexicons. JCIDS analyses are typically based on a 
number of different and changing requirements documents and 
analytical databases. While the prescribed structure of 
JCIDS-required analytical artifacts embodies some rigor in 
terminology, content, and underlying requirements, there is 
no data structure required that would maintain data 
relationships, data currency, or data source and 
credibility. Architectures based on a standard framework, 
e.g., DoDAF, could serve this function. DoD and DoN policy 
and guidance do not preclude it, but neither do they 
prescribe it. 
The development of system requirements is part of the 
Navy Systems Engineering Guide (2006) “Requirements 
Definition Process” and its three sub-processes: “Acquirer 
Requirements,” “Other Stakeholder Requirements,” and 
“System Technical Requirements.” The primary product of 
this portion of the systems engineering process is a System 
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Requirements Document (SRD). This process can also be 
indexed in a generic systems engineering sense to the 
“conceptual design phase” (Blanchard, 2006) whose output is 
a system specification or “A spec.” 
Before examining the adequacy of DoD/DoN policy and 
guidance for development of system requirements, a brief 
discussion of the term “system requirements” is warranted. 
SECNAV Instruction 5002.D (2008) refers to a “System Design 
Specification” and describes it as flowing down from the 
Capability Development Document and providing basic 
functional requirements as well as major program 
requirements of the preferred solution alternative. 
SECNAVINST 5000.2D (2008) is DoN acquisition policy. The 
Navy Systems Engineering Guide (2006) uses the term “System 
Requirements Document,” noting that it evolves into a 
system specification. In the guide, the tasks necessary to 
produce a System Requirements Document and its content are 
described. The guide is based on EIA 632 (1999). 
Other policy and guidance documents use various terms 
for specifications and requirements, some well defined, 
e.g., DoD-Std-961E, and others not. The IEEE Guide for 
Developing System Requirements Specifications (IEEE Std 
1233, 1998) is noteworthy for several reasons. First, it 
provides definitions for terms which comprise the metadata 
for requirements and specifications. Many of those terms 
are linked to their own IEEE standards. Understanding and 
agreement between user and developer on the metadata and 
their definitions, is a prerequisite to users and 
developers being able to successfully communicate about a 
specific set of system requirements. Second, IEEE Std 1233 
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(1998) specifically recognizes the importance and challenge 
of communicating requirements between user and developer. 
Specifically: 
A System Requirements Specification (SRS) has 
traditionally been viewed as a document that 
communicates the requirements of the customer to 
the technical community who will specify and 
build the system. The collection of requirements 
that constitutes the specification and its 
representation acts as the bridge between the two 
groups and must be understandable by both the 
customer and the technical community. One of the 
most difficult tasks in the creation of a system 
is that of communicating to all of the subgroups 
within both groups, especially in one document. 
This type of communication generally requires 
different formalisms and languages. 
Finally, while IEEE Std 1233 (1998) provides detailed 
guidance for developing system requirements specifications, 
it does not prescribe an industry-wide specification 
standard. It states: “This guide is written under the 
premise that the current state of the art of system 
development does not warrant or support a formal standards 
document.” Experience has shown and research supports the 
difficulty of creating specific templates for requirements 
and specification types. The recursive and iterative nature 
of the engineering development process leads to a continuum 
of specification and requirement types. Unfortunately this 
causes difficulty when trying to synchronize requirements, 
acquisition, and systems engineering processes. 
Returning to the question of adequacy of policy and 
guidance for development of system requirements, (Naval 
Systems Engineering Guide, 2004) does provide the following 
details for each of the three previously discussed sub-
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processes which comprise the Requirements Definition 
Process: Preceding Processes, Inputs, Entry Criteria, 
Tasks, Outputs, Exit Criteria, Next Processes, Agents, 
Tools, References, and Metrics and Measures. In many cases, 
details are found in other, cross-referenced (Naval Systems 
Engineering Guide, 2004) processes or appendices. However, 
as with JCIDS, there is no guidance for organizing or 
managing the metadata or data which comprise the 
requirements, use of tools or models, or translating 
between models and prose-based documents. IEEE Std 1233 
(1998), while it does not address the use of architectures, 
provides substantial guidance on approaches to development 
and management of system requirements between user and 
developer communities. DoD and DoN guidance lack this 
detail. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
DoD and DoN requirements, acquisition, and systems 
engineering processes and associated guidance and standards 
comprise a substantial amount of interrelated data, even 
when limited to discussion of requirements development as 
in this study. Research performed for this study has 
revealed semantic inconsistencies and ambiguities as well 
as a multiplicity of system engineering processes, guidance 
and standards. It is difficult to trace data and process 
relationships in a systems engineering context. As a 
consequence it is difficult to rigorously and unambiguously 
identify a user need and translate it into a comprehensive 
and complete set of system requirements. Just the lack of 
specificity of roles and accountability for each of the  
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necessary activities in the requirements translation 
process represents a significant challenge for successful 
requirements development. 
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VI. APPLICATION TO NAVAL WARFARE SYSTEMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The premise for this study is the assertion that for 
Naval warfare systems, the process of translation of user 
needs to system requirements is not sufficiently rigorous 
and repeatable to ensure consistently complete and valid 
system requirements. This results in significant increases 
to program cost, schedule and risk as requirements issues 
are resolved later in development. Support for this 
assertion is found in a recent Government Accounting Office 
Report (GAO-08-782T, 2008): 
At the strategic level, DOD does not prioritize 
weapon system investments and the department’s 
processes for matching warfighter needs with 
resources are fragmented and broken. Furthermore, 
the requirements and acquisition processes are 
not agile enough to support programs that can 
meet current operational requirements. At the 
program level, programs are started without 
knowing what resources will truly be needed and 
are managed with lower levels of product 
knowledge at critical junctures than expected 
under best practices standards. In the absence of 
such knowledge, managers rely heavily on 
assumptions about system requirements, 
technology, and design maturity, which are 
consistently too optimistic. This exposes 
programs to significant and unnecessary 
technology, design, and production risks, and 
ultimately damaging cost growth and schedule 
delays. 
Previous chapters discussed DoN requirements and 
systems engineering processes, suggested system 
architectures are under-utilized as a means of facilitating 
and integrating those processes, and described conceptually 
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how and when architectures should be used and the benefits 
that would accrue from their use. This chapter provides a 
discussion of the use of architectures with consideration 
for typical constraints and characteristics of warfare 
systems employed by U.S. Navy surface combatants, e.g., 
cruisers and destroyers. 
B. CHARACTERIZATION OF U.S. NAVY SURFACE WARFARE SYSTEMS 
Current warfare system development efforts for surface 
combatants are predominantly modifications, i.e., 
evolutions of existing systems. Even the warfare systems 
being developed for the DDG 1000, Zumwalt class destroyer 
will be predominantly evolutionary. The following 
illustrates the degree to which the Navy will be using 
currently fielded systems for many years to come. 
There are currently 62, DDG 51, Arleigh Burke class 
destroyers either in the Fleet, under construction, or 
under contract. The earliest any of those ships is planned 
for decommissioning is 2026. Of the 22 (of 27 constructed) 
Ticonderoga class cruisers remaining in commission, none is 
planned for decommissioning before 2026. Currently, only 
three Zumwalt class destroyers are planned. A follow-on 
cruiser requirement i.e., CGX, is underway but has not 
reached Milestone B, the point at which it becomes an 
acquisition program. 
In addition to the length of time current ship classes 
will continue to form the backbone of the surface fleet, 
the time required to modernize a ship class is 
considerable. The time required for construction of a 
cruiser/destroyer and the annual production rate promotes 
significant configuration differences among ships from 
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oldest to newest. This adds further complexity to upgrade 
plans. Cruiser and destroyer modernization programs already 
underway, during which warfare systems will be upgraded, 
will span over 20 years from the first ship modernized to 
the last. 
The Navy’s current investment in surface combatant 
warfare systems, the cycle time for development and 
deployment, and the number of systems with which it must 
interoperate has created a type of system “inertia” and 
infrastructure that significantly constrains and adds 
complexity to warfare system development. Further 
constraints are applied by requirements for Joint and 
coalition-level interoperability. This stands in dramatic 
contrast to average, commercial product development and 
life cycle times. 
The Apple iPod began development in February 2001, 
starting with a partially-developed design from another 
company, and was brought to market during the Christmas 
season the same year. Subsequently, new generations of 
iPods have been released almost annually. 
Another study in contrast to commercial product 
development is cell phones. According to an Environmental 
Protection Agency brochure (2005), cell phones are used for 
only 18 months on average before being discarded. iPODs and 
cell phones are orders of magnitude simpler in design and 
integration relative to typical DoN warfare systems, but 
some of the commercial technologies they incorporate are 
representative of those sought after in DoN warfare 
systems. 
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In spite of the Navy’s overall, long product 
development cycle and longer product life cycle, warfare 
systems employ significant amounts of commercially-based 
computer hardware and software that follow shorter, 
commercial product cycles. The Navy’s need to take 
advantage of rapidly evolving computer technology within a 
more slowly evolving warfare system, within slower-still 
platform (i.e., surface combatant) development, adds 
further to product development complexity. 
The dynamic nature of warfare capability requirements 
adds yet another dimension of complexity. Requirements are 
reviewed and changes are made at least every two years and 
often more frequently. The pattern of incremental 
improvements to capability over time together with periodic 
requirements changes form a metaphorical moving target. 
C. TOP-DOWN REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT 
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), an example 
of required U.S. Navy capability, exists in the Fleet 
today. The DoN Enterprise Architecture Hierarchy (2008) is 
consistent with and maps to the DoD Enterprise 
Architecture. The DoN IAMD capability component flows down 
as follows: Force Protection, to Sea Shield, to Joint 
Protection, to Protect Against Conventional Weapons, to 
Integrated Air and Missile Defense. IAMD for surface 
combatants is predominantly performed by radar (i.e., 
detect), a command and decision (C&D) system (i.e., 
control) and missiles (i.e., engage).  
Establishment of a Fleet need for a new or improved 
combat C&D system can be initiated via dissemination of 
Fleets’ prioritized operational needs and validation by the 
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JCIDS process. To validate the requirement, the operational 
need should be traced from high level documents starting 
with the President’s National Security Strategy (2006) and 
flowing down to the National Defense Strategy (2008) which 
“informs” the National Military Strategy (2004). While 
these requirements documents are hierarchical, some others 
are complementary rather than hierarchical. The following 
paragraphs discuss some aspects of these key, policy 
documents. 
Nine essential tasks comprise The National Security 
Strategy (2006). Some, such as “Champion Aspirations for 
Human Dignity” do not substantially involve military 
capability. Others such as “Work with Others to Defuse 
Regional Conflicts” clearly involve military capability. 
However, most should be expected to involve multi-
dimensional solutions, involving military capability, 
diplomacy, and politics. Use of military force is 
typically, though not always, employed as a course of last 
resort when objectives cannot be achieved by non-military 
means. Therefore, while it is possible to map National 
Defense Strategy (2008) objectives (i.e., Defend the 
Homeland, Win the Long War, Promote Security, Deter 
Conflict, and Win our Nation’s Wars) to the National 
Security Strategy, it is only abstractly possible to 
decompose the National Security Strategy into the National 
Defense Strategy. From a requirements analysis standpoint, 
it is more useful to begin requirements flow-down from the 
National Defense Strategy. 
Examination of the National Defense Strategy (2008) 
does reveal a linkage to the National Security Strategy 
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(2006). But, it also illustrates that even within the 
Defense strategy, the types of capabilities and the levels 
of capabilities necessary to achieve objectives cannot be 
derived from those documents. In other words, they are 
functional statements of user need. From the National 
Defense Strategy: “We will work with and through like-
minded states to help shrink the ungoverned areas of the 
world and thereby deny extremists and other hostile parties 
sanctuary.” Also: “…arguably the most important military 
component of the struggle against violent extremists is not 
the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare 
our partners to defend and govern themselves.” 
The National Military Strategy (2004): 
…provides focus for military activities by 
defining a set of interrelated military 
objectives and joint operating concepts from 
which the Service Chiefs and combatant commanders 
identify desired capabilities and against which 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
assesses risk. 
The National Military Strategy (2004) establishes 
three objectives that support the National Defense 
Strategy: Protect the United States, prevent conflict and 
surprise attack, and prevail against adversaries. Related 
Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs) describe how the Joint 
Force conducts missions and supports the Joint Functional 
Concepts of: Force application, protection, focused 
logistics, battlespace awareness, and command and control. 
Note that “Force Protection” is the top tier capability 
discussed in the requirements flow-down to IAMD. 
Realization of IAMD capability requires a system of 
systems. It cannot deliver required warfighting capability 
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without its constituent systems. Furthermore, the system of 
systems exists operationally as parts of surface combatant 
platforms. When mapping between required capability and 
supporting systems, many-to-one and one-to-many 
relationships are revealed. 
Consider the basis for initiation of a Fleet 
requirement for a new or upgraded combat C&D system. 
Capability shortfalls when mapped to functions can run the 
gamut of DOTMLPF. Obsolescence or reliability issues might 
exist; or, old or proprietary software may not be 
maintainable. Training may require high-cost, specialized 
equipment. Issues of this nature can be expressed in terms 
of either cost of ownership or system availability. If no 
performance improvements are warranted, the user 
requirement can be expressed in terms of reducing cost of 
ownership and increasing availability. This illustrates the 
point that user needs do not necessarily translate into 
requirements for system development, i.e., a materiel 
solution. 
However, performance improvement may be required. For 
example processor speed or the computing architecture might 
not support the level of performance needed for the 
projected threat environment. Or, the current C&D, or 
combat system as a whole, may not be designed to counter an 
emergent threat, for instance small, high-speed craft, 
e.g., Rubber Inflatable Boats. Though improving processing 
speed might be one solution, improvements to detection or 




provide viable solutions. There is significant tradeoff 
analysis required to determine which requirements comprise 
the trade space. 
A Fleet requirement as initially expressed may in some 
cases convey an implicit or explicit solution. In other 
cases, there may be only a generalized statement of 
operational need. In either case, for complex systems and 
systems-of-systems, use of some analytical methodology can 
help ensure: 
 
• The system is properly defined (e.g., bounded) 
• The trade space is properly defined 
• Fleet requirements are posed in a “what” form 
versus a “how” form, i.e., the requirement should 
not contain the solution. 
• All significant aspects of the system, i.e., 
DOTMLPF, its environment, and systems it 
interoperates with are considered. 
 
A requirements model or combination of models should 
be used to support requirements development, and both 
direct and indirect requirements imposed by legacy systems 
must be captured in a comparable form. 
Any U.S. Navy warfare system being considered for 
development or improvement must be integrated into existing 
architectures, whether or not those architectures are well 
documented. So, to some degree an architecture is imposed 
on a proposed system long before a solution, i.e., design, 
is conceived. Even for an unprecedented system on an 
unprecedented platform, the sailors who man the ship, 
environmental and navigations standards, the weapons, the 
communications networks, and other interoperating platforms 
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comprise an architecture into which the new system must 
fit. If the architecture is undocumented, it is incumbent 
upon the system developer to ensure accurate documentation 
is produced. If the architecture is documented, the 
adequacy must be assessed and any shortfalls addressed. 
Different approaches exist to model requirements. In 
choosing an approach, two key questions are: Will the 
model(s) used result in a complete requirement’s set? That 
is, does the model fully and accurately describe all 
behaviors of the system? These questions are particularly 
critical to DoN warfare systems considering the array of 
threats, operating environments, modes of operation, and 
the speed with which combat operations are conducted. 
Often, a ship’s required response to a threat is measured 
in seconds. 
Use case modeling is frequently used as the basis for 
architecture development, particularly for software-
intensive systems, as exemplified by U.S. Navy warfare 
systems. On this subject, Daniels (2005) speaks to the 
first question above: Will the chosen approach capture all 
requirements? His assertion is that in spite of the 
popularity and utility of use cases as a basis for 
customer-developer communications and the resultant system 
requirements set, there are shortcomings including the fact 
that use cases do not contain all of the requirements. He 
notes: “To keep use cases simple, readable, and manageable, 
they can only tell a fraction of the complete story without 
becoming unwieldy and difficult to understand.” He proposes 
combining a use case approach with a more traditional 
specification of “shall statements,” a natural language-
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based model. Shall statements can add detail to and 
complement use cases and are better suited for capturing 
non-functional requirements such as how well a system must 
do something versus simply what a system must do. 
Hatley (1987) presents a system requirements 
development process that views a system from process and  
control aspects. The process component of the model shows 
what functions the system must perform. The control 
component describes the circumstances under which the 
function will be performed. The author suggests the use of 
“data flow diagrams” (DFDs) and “process specifications” 
(PSPECs) for modeling processing and “control flow 
diagrams” (CFDs) and “control specifications” (CSPECs) to 
model system control. 
A simple example to illustrate the importance of 
modeling system control processes is the automated checkout 
stations in grocery and other retail stores. There are a 
number of such systems in use but they perform mostly the 
same functions. Data is taken from the customer (e.g., 
selection of language, telephone number or zip code, etc.), 
instruction is given to scan items, then the customer is 
prompted to select a method of payment and follow a series 
of steps to complete the transaction. The data flow is not 
particularly complex. However, the systems have subtle 
timing and sequencing controls. If an item is laid in the 
wrong area before scanning, the process will not proceed. 
If a scanned item sits too long without being moved to the 




number (possibly a basis for product discounts) is not 
entered when prompted at the beginning of the process, that 
opportunity is lost. 
Implicit in the design of the self-check-out system 
are expectations of customer behavior (e.g., how long will 
it take for a customer to bag an item) and constraints on 
customer behavior (e.g., certain timing or sequences of 
actions may be indicative of attempts to pilfer and are 
therefore not allowed). The success with which these 
requirements are modeled directly affects customer 
throughput, customer satisfaction, and likely the rate of 
pilferage, so it is clearly an important aspect of the 
system requirements. U.S. Navy warfare systems have 
extensive timing and sequence dependencies in order to 
ensure safe and effective operation. 
D. REQUIREMENTS AND ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
EXAMPLE 
The U.S. Navy’s next generation cruiser is currently 
designated “CGX.” Among its required capabilities is IAMD. 
A much-simplified decomposition of this capability is a 
sequence of three processes: detect, control, and engage. 
Incoming threats are sensed, a decision is made on how best 
to prosecute the target, and then weapons are utilized to 
defeat the threat. A similar process model is the “Observe, 
Orient, Detect, Act” or “OODA loop” model conceived by USAF 
Colonel John Boyd (Fein, 2003) to describe the air-to-air 
combat process. These functional models describe what a 
system has to do. A complete specification of user need 
would include what the system must do, e.g., detect- 
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control-engage, how well it must perform e.g., Probability 
of Raid Annihilation, and what constraints are imposed, 
e.g., open architecture design.  
This example facilitates discussion of key aspects of 
requirements and architecture development. The objectives 
of the example are: 
 
• Show how requirements can be captured and 
organized with a structured process that 
facilitates completeness as well as understanding 
by both user and developer 
• Show how requirements and architecture models 
facilitate integration of a developmental 
system’s requirements with those of legacy 
systems with which it interoperates. 
 
The approach used combines aspects of a hybrid 
approach described in Daniels (2005) with the Process for 
System Architecture and Requirements Engineering (PSARE), 
(Hatley, 2000). It is primarily the PSARE process, but 
plain language use cases are employed as the means of 
initial requirements collection due to their ability to 
facilitate effective communication between user and 
developer. Daniel’s suggestion to incorporate plain 
language requirements with linkages to requirements models 
is also adopted. 
1. Process for System Architecture and Requirements 
Engineering (PSARE) 
Hatley (1987) describes a formal process for 
development of system specifications that utilizes 
requirements and architecture models that are consistent 
with one another. Though Hatley only refers to one of the 
 81
models as an architecture model, the two models can be 
considered as two views of a system architecture. The 
requirements model represents the operational view and the 
architecture model represents the systems view. The PSARE 
is applicable to both hardware and software, is 
specifically applicable to real-time systems, and can 
facilitate development of DoN-mandated DoDAF products. 
Table 1 summarizes features and benefits. 
 
Table 1 PSARE Features and Benefits, From Haggerty, 2008. 
This table captures attributes of PSARE that make it widely 
applicable, objective, and comprehensive in a modeling 
sense. It is not however, necessarily easy to implement. 
 
The methodology of PSARE is not the only viable 
approach for DoN warfare systems. However, Hatleys (2000) 
process-oriented approach as well as PSARE’s real-time 
system application heritage make it more straightforward to 
apply and more suitable than some others. 
Requirements and architecture models comprise the 
PSARE products. The requirements model captures functional 
and non-functional requirements as well as system control 
behavior. The architecture model describes how the system 
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will fulfill the requirements. A requirements-to-
architecture template provides a structure for allocation 
of requirements to architecture modules. Though the 
architecture model accommodates description of a system 
solution which goes beyond the scope of this study, the 
extensive presence of legacy systems even in new, U.S. Navy 
system development makes it germane to the requirements 
development discussion. The PSARE is non-sequential, 
meaning it does not have to move from requirements to 
architectures. It accommodates pre-existing portions of an 
architecture and allows for derivation of requirements from 
architectures when expedient. Figure 8 summarizes the 
interaction among models. The Enhanced Requirements Model 
depicted in the lower right-hand corner accounts for 
technological and other constraints imposed on the system. 
 
Figure 8 System Specification Models, From Hatley, 2000. 
The recursive approach to development of the models which 
comprise PSARE are illustrated by the curves arrows to and 
from the models in each of the three corners. The spiral in 
the center indicates hierarchical layers of the models. 
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The requirements model, with enhancements, is 
developed through a series of process steps whereby: 
 
• Customer requirements are organized into 
functional groups 
• External systems with which the system must 
communicate are identified 
• Information flowing between the system and 
external entities is identified 
• A top-level flow diagram, showing the functional 
groups as processes, the external entities as 
terminator, and information groups as data flows 
is drawn 
• A context diagram is derived from the top-level 
flow diagram 
• A level 1 diagram is constructed from the top-
level flow diagram without terminators 
• Control signals are added as required 
• Each process in the level 1 diagram is decomposed 
into a child diagram. 
• Performance Specifications (PSPECS) and Control 
Specifications (CSPECS) are created at the last 
level of decomposition. 
• A requirements dictionary catalogs data flows and 
control flows (i.e., requirements) 
 
The architecture model is developed using the 
architecture template to enhance the requirements model and 
then allocating the requirements to physical entities 
(Hatley, 1987). 
The example follows these steps with some changes to 
accommodate Daniel’s (2005) hybrid process. Use cases, if 
developed at the initial step in the requirements model 
development, help communication between user and developer 
and help ensure an accounting of the full range of required 
behavior of the system. The use cases also help in  
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development of subsequent requirements model diagrams and 
serve as a cross-checking mechanism for diagrams’ 
correctness. 
2. Problem Statement 
Figure 9 shows a notional, joint, operational view of 
IAMD including the integration of weapons, sensors and 
command and control systems necessary to execute a detect-
control-engage process for IAMD. 
 
Figure 9 Joint IAMD Operational View, From Baldwin, 2006. 
This view, though it depicts systems, is not solution 
specific. The spacecraft, ships, aircraft, and ground-based 
systems should be viewed as operational nodes where 
activity occurs. 
 
To provide IAMD, the cruiser must detect and track 
multiple targets, both aircraft and missiles, prioritize 




threat characteristics and kinematics, and prosecute the 
threats. This follows the aforementioned detect-control-
engage functional construct. 
3. Requirements Model 
The requirements model can begin with construction of 
use cases. Use cases, as defined in Cockburn (2001) 
“…describes the system’s behavior under various conditions 
as the system responds to a request from one of the 
stakeholders…”. Although charts, diagrams and automated 
tools can be used in the construction of use cases, 
Cockburn suggests a fundamentally text form helps 
communication between user and developer, or stakeholder 
and developer, without imposing any special training 
requirements to be able to understand uses cases. 
Development of use cases requires involvement or 
representation of most or all of the stakeholders, to the 
extent different stakeholders have different goals. For 
example, the goal of a stakeholder who is a system 
maintainer would be interested in system attributes that 
support a low mean time to repair, and probably also 
infrequent scheduled maintenance. The goal of a system 
manufacturing stakeholder might be concerned with system 
attributes that ensure high production rates, avoidance of 
specialized manufacturing labor, use of proven 
technologies, etc.  
The process can begin with a general description of a 
scenario where all goals are satisfied. Cockburn (2001) 
defines this as the main success scenario. He views all 
other ways to succeed, or fail, as extensions of the main 
success scenario. The scenario is written as a series of 
 86
actions or activities required to achieve the goal. It is 
not the intent of this study to present a detailed 
description of the use case development process. Rather, 
the objective is to illustrate the advantage of 
incorporating use cases into the PSARE. Use case 
development can add an intuitive structure to the process 
of identifying the requirements model elements, their 
relationships, and what purpose they really serve, as well 
as initiating a set of plain language requirements to 
complement graphical and tabular models. 
A Main Success Scenario for IAMD could be written as 
follows: 
 
• The operator engages the ship’s sensors to scan a 
3D volume for hostile aircraft and missiles. 
• The search portion of the detect function 
provides radar and IFF data to the control 
function. 
• Off-board target track data is received by the 
control function. 
• The control function initiates and maintains 
target tracks. 
• The control function determines if targets are 
engageable. 
• The control function assigns weapons to 
engageable, hostile targets. 
• The engage function prosecutes hostile targets 
with weapons. 
This sequence, when reviewed by stakeholders would 
likely be revised, as each subject matter expert brings a 
different perspective and set of experiences. It is also 
evident that most of the steps can be decomposed. There is 
a great deal of complexity underlying the control function 
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initiates and maintains target tracks. The decomposition of 
use cases parallels decomposition as part of PSARE. To 
accommodate particular threat targets that cause the system 
to behave differently, or to accommodate different 
environments or states of readiness, extensions can be 
appended onto the main success scenario at branch points. 
Having begun with development of a use case, or set of 
use cases, the construction of the requirements model then 
proceeds as described in Hatley (1987). The details of 
model development occupy a significant portion of that book 
and will not be reiterated here. Instead, examples of the 
graphical and tabular model elements are shown and comments 
are provided to explain the progression and relationship of 
model elements. 
Building an environment model requires representation 
of both the system processes and those processes outside 
the system, i.e., the environment. The environment 
comprises those entities beyond the boundary of the IAMD 
system that play a role in IAMD and exchange information, 
energy or material. The detect function generates sensor 
data from both hostile targets and friendly forces. The 
control function receives track data from remote sources, 
i.e., other platforms. The control function also receives 
data from and contributes to onboard C4I (Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence). The engage 
function passes data to and from the control function and 
also interacts with the target in terms of target signature 
and weapon homing sensors. This model is shown graphically 
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Figure 10 IAMD Environment Model. 
The environment model includes all functions affecting 
system behavior and is the first step in identifying system 
boundaries. 
 
The exchanges of information, energy or material among 
processes can be categorized as data or control exchanges. 
Continuous signals, such as target signatures, are data 
exchanges. Discrete signals such as commanding a weapon 
launch are usually control exchanges. In Figure 10, data 
from the control process is, logically, predominantly 
control-oriented. Sensor data is typically data-oriented, 
and engage data is a mixture of data and control exchanges. 
Figure 9 is a Level 1 diagram. Its component processes and 
data flows can be decomposed as necessary to achieve 
sufficient requirements detail. 
From the environment model construction of a context-
level model Hatley (2000) is begun by bounding those 
portions of the environmental model that are included in 
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the system. This is shown in Figure 11. The bounded portion 
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Figure 11 Environment Model with System Boundary Applied. 
The closed curve represents decisions regarding what to 
include in the system under study. 
 
The context process is derived by collapsing all 
processes inside the bounded area into one process. 
Processes outside the boundary are replaced by terminators, 
the physical agents that perform the processes. Making 
these changes, a requirements context diagram for IAMD can 
be constructed. In Figure 12, the detect-control-engage 
processes have been collapsed into a single IAMD process 






















Figure 12 IAMD Requirements Context Diagram. 
The context diagram aggregates all of the activities inside 
the system boundary into one activity, “IAMD.” Activities 
outside the system boundary are replaced with the actors 
that perform the activities. 
 
Next, the system’s functionality is reviewed to 
determine if any data/material/energy flows did not get 
incorporated into the environment model. The resultant Data 
Flow Diagram (DFD) is shown in Figure 13. Earlier, control 
and data processes and flows were differentiated and it was 
stated that the IAMD process exhibited both. To simplify 
this example, all processes and flows are shown as data. In 
practice, Control Flow Diagrams (CFDs) would be constructed 
in addition to the DFDs. Each would depict the same 
processes, but one would show control flows and the other 
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Figure 13 IAMD Data Flow Diagram. 
This diagram shows processes in circles, data stores as 
labels with lines above and below, and data flows as arrows 
between processes and stores. 
 
The last level of decomposition of DFDs is Process 
Specifications or PSPECs. According to Hatley (1987) “The 
primary role of the process specification…is to describe 
how its inputs and outputs are generated from its inputs; 
it must do nothing more and nothing less.” PSPECs can 
contain textual, tabular, graphical and mathematical 
elements. A notionalized example is shown below, based on a 
decomposed element of the detect process. 
 
PSPEC1: Detect Filter 
Radar returns (i.e., signatures) of airborne objects are 
input to the IAMD sensor. The signal strength relative to 
the calculated object’s range is assessed. If the signal 
strength correlates to aircraft or missiles, the object is 
reported as a detected object. 
Table 2 IAMD Process Specifications. 
This is a process description at the lowest level of 
decomposition. 
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If it is determined that the system requirement model 
must include control flow diagrams, then Control 
Specifications, i.e., CSPECs, also need to be generated. An 
example CSPEC is not presented but in one form can be 
visualized as a decision table or Boolean equation. 
A requirements dictionary, typically instantiated in a 
database, contains definitions of all the elements used in 
the models. Per Hatley (2000), “Every data flow, control 
flow, and store used anywhere in the DFDs, CFDs, and CSPECs 
must be defined in the dictionary.” Table 3 provides some 
notional definitions as well as metadata, i.e., the column 
headings. 
 
Name Meaning & Composition Type Units Rate 
IFF Data Friendly A/C ID and 
position 





From Target Range, bearing, 
elevation 






Control Data Wave form commands, 
cuing, power level 
commands, etc. 
Control  Once per 
second 
Target Homing 





















Table 3 IAMD Data Requirements Dictionary Content. 




4. Architecture Model 
The architecture model represents a system’s design, 
which is beyond the scope of this study. However, in most 
instances of DoN warfare system development, at least 
portions of an architecture exist at the outset of system 
development. They can be interfacing systems or subsystems, 
standards, which create constraints on the system 
requirement, or they can take the form of direct 
constraints such as size, weight, power consumption, 
safety, reliability, etc. System requirements can be 
derived from these architectural elements and incorporated 
into the requirements model. Therefore, construction of an 
architecture model supports development of a comprehensive 
requirements model and system specification. 
Hatley (1987) describes a Requirements-to-Architecture 
Template that places the requirements model in a context of 
physical modules as shown in Figure 14. The requirements 
model resides in the portion entitled Main Processing (Core 
Functions). The development of architecture model elements 
involves creation of architecture context diagrams, 
architecture flow diagrams, architecture interconnect 
diagrams, an architecture dictionary, and module 
specifications. Their forms are analogous to elements of 
the requirements model, but from a physical rather than 
operational perspective. The PSARE process maintains 




Figure 14 PSARE Architecture Template, from Hatley, 1987. 
“Main processing” represents the physical system under 
study. The surrounding blocks represent physical modules 
that interact with the system under study. 
 
Considering the IABM example, system development is 
certain to involve already-existing sensors, software, 
processors, weapons, or services infrastructure. The Navy’s 
objectives of achieving open system design, use of 
Commercial, Off-The-Shelf hardware, and maximization of 
hardware and software re-use among systems imposes a large 
set of standards. Therefore, in beginning an IABM system 
development, major portions of the system specification can 
be derived from the architecture model. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presents the fundamental characteristics 
of U.S. Navy warfare systems that affect the systems 
engineering and architecture processes. It further shows, 
utilizing a blended use case and PSARE process, that 
requirements and architectures models can be constructed in 
an integrated, structured, repeatable manner that when 
complete, provide the basis for a complete set of system 
requirements. Furthermore, the requirements model is in 
fact an operational view of the system’s architecture and 
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the architecture model represents the system view of the 
architecture, enabling generation of required DoDAF 
products, but having been created by and for the systems 
engineering process. It is done in a way that provides a 
full accounting of requirements in a design. 
This type of process is not provided as part of the 
DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF, 2007) or the Naval 
Systems Engineering Guide (2004). 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
A. KEY POINTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A substantial body of work among Government and 
industry exists regarding system engineering standards and 
processes. Standards and practices have been evolved, 
refined, interpreted, and exercised over a period of 
approximately 50 years. The value of systems engineering 
has been shown to lie in its ability to manage complexity 
in system development such that systems produced will 
predictably satisfy user needs. Yet, numerous examples 
exist of warfare systems that exceed schedule and cost 
requirements and do not meet operational requirements. 
Shortcomings appear to exist in the application and 
management of systems engineering principles. 
Development of architectures to support DoD system 
development has a significantly shorter history than 
systems engineering, dating back only to the early 1990’s, 
and the initial objective was solely to improve 
interoperability of C4I systems. The more broadly scoped 
DoD Architecture Framework Version 1.0 was approved in 
2003, less than six years ago. 
The JCIDS process, also less than six years old, is 
ostensibly dependent on architectures as an analytical 
basis, but has not resulted in desired levels of 
improvement in terms of ensuring Joint solutions, 
supporting capability acquisition, and reducing redundant 
or excess capability, while reliability identifying 
capability gaps. 
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Though efforts are underway to establish and maintain 
a DoN Enterprise architecture and to capture system-of-
system level architectures, to date most architectures are 
developed independently at the system level. Governance, 
i.e., approval and configuration control, is weak beyond 
the system level. Responsibility for operational 
architecture and system architecture development is split, 
and funding for architecture development is fragmented and 
inconsistent from year to year. The consequence of all this 
is a lack of higher-level architectures to support JCIDS 
analysis. This problem is compounded by JCIDS’ dependency 
on the Programming, Planning, Budgeting, and Execution 
(PPBE) process, which follows a biannual cycle. The JCIDS 
process cannot alter its rhythm to “wait” for architecture 
products. 
In spite of mandated systems engineering and 
architecture standards, the relationship between system 
architecting and system engineering is poorly defined in 
DoD policy and instructions, and processes for development 
of architecture models as part of a systems engineering 
process are not prescribed. System engineering and 
architecture artifacts required by the DoN acquisition 
process do not promote or ensure integration of systems 
engineering with system architecting. The process and 
purpose of system architecting is poorly understood by 
system acquisition managers and decision-makers. And, as in 
the case of the JCIDS process, higher level, i.e., above 
product level, architecture development often does not keep 
pace with the acquisition process. 
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Translation of operational requirements to a set of 
system requirements is a vitally important part of the 
systems engineering process. Yet, ambiguity exists in 
definition of roles across DoN organizations, in terms and 
definitions, and in the necessary order and timing of 
events in this process. As a result, demonstration of 
system requirements completeness and traceability of system 
requirements to operational requirements is not 
consistently practiced. 
Most significant among the causes for process 
disconnects are management-related and organizational. To 
make policy and resource decisions necessary for better 
process integration requires better understanding of system 
engineering and architectures than currently exists at the 
management level. Once policy and resource positions are 
developed, a DoN organization whose size and fragmentation 
by product line, near-term or long-term vision, and 
operational versus acquisition communities makes consensus 
difficult to achieve. Maintaining a Joint perspective adds 
yet another dimension of complexity. 
Technical reasons are among the lesser for poor 
integration and execution of systems engineering, JCIDS, 
and architecture processes. Rigorous methods exist to model 
system requirements and architectures in a manner that 
supports mandated DoD Architecture Framework products while 
maintaining close-coupling with the systems engineering 
process. These methods can capture the behavior of complex, 
Naval warfare systems, maintain traceability to higher 
level requirements, and incorporate plain language views of  
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requirements. The community of skilled practitioners may 
not be large enough to rapidly increase the use of these 
methods. 
There are several initiatives underway that could 
improve both integration and effectiveness of systems 
engineering, architecture, and JCIDS processes. Systems 
engineering both at the DoD and DoN level has received 
increased attention in policy and guidance over the last 
several years. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2004) 
devotes 98 of 520 pages to systems engineering. Most other 
Service and industry standards and guidebooks are less than 
five years old. The DoN recently adopted a common systems 
engineering technical review guide for all acquisition 
programs. Systems Engineering Plans are being given more 
attention. 
In Joint Staff Instruction CJCSI 3170.01F (2007) which 
documents JCIDS policy, the Summary of Changes section 
notes that changes from the last version reflect “…lessons 
learned and changes as a result of implementation of the 
JCIDS process.” Both the instruction and related manual 
(CJCSM 3170.01C, 2007) have been updated frequently in an 
effort to improve effectiveness of the process. 
DoD Architecture Framework 2.0, currently in draft, 
was begun before issuance of the current, DoD Architecture 
Framework Version 1.5 (2007). Committees working on those 
documents recognized areas in need of change, but the large 
community of stakeholders and the large investment in the 
current framework slows the process of revision. 
As the previous three paragraphs illustrate, 
significant effort is being expended updating and improving 
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policy and guidance for systems engineering, JCIDS, and 
architectures. And, effective systems engineering methods 
have been demonstrated on significantly complex systems. In 
light of remaining acquisition issues at least partially 
traceable to systems engineering failures, there must still 
be hindrances to improved effectiveness of the 
abovementioned processes. 
The systems engineering competency needs to be 
strengthened. A recent collaborative initiative between the 
ASN(RD&A) and the Naval Postgraduate School will 
significantly increase opportunities for DoN engineers to 
pursue Master’s degrees in systems engineering. However, 
competence in systems engineering, perhaps more than some 
other engineering disciplines, requires a wealth of 
experience typically acquired over many years. DoN 
engineers need experience as systems engineering 
practitioners in addition to education. 
The increased emphasis on Joint, network-centric 
warfare results in systems-of-systems that cross boundaries 
of Services, organizations within Services, funding, 
requirements, political, and more. This type of construct 
hampers the effective integration and implementation of 
systems engineering, JCIDS, and architecture processes 
simply by making decision-making among a diverse community 
of stakeholders, considerably more difficult. A solution to 
this problem must address, among other things, the 
political process of funding appropriation and an ever-
increasing desire by the Congress to perform DoD management 
functions. To the extent a way can be found to parse  
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complex systems-of-systems for system development and still 
maintain requirements and funding integrity, this problem 
can be mitigated. 
Overall, a plan to improve integration and 
effectiveness of systems engineering, requirements, and 
architecture processes must be treated holistically and 
with a long-term vision. There is an enormous investment in 
fielded systems as well as those currently under 
development. Future systems cannot completely escape the 
effects of those systems’ paradigms. Progress will be 
evolutionary, not revolutionary.   
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The DoD Architecture Framework is currently under 
revision. Once issued, analysis of the revised framework 
for improvements in the areas of integration with systems 
engineering, and inclusion of architecture development 
process guidance would be useful. 
System architecting for highly complex systems is not 
inexpensive. Justification of funding for system 
architecting is made more difficult by a cost-benefit 
relationship that is difficult to quantify and validate. 
Exploration of cost justification methods for system 
architecting would contribute to a more rational basis for 
investing in this area. 
The analytical basis for system architecting is 
challenging for practitioners to master and even more 
challenging for practitioners to discuss with managers and 
customers. This is true to the extent that just the 
inclusion of the term “architecture” in a management-level 
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brief is often a carefully considered decision. Yet, a 
means of successfully communicating the concepts of system 
architecting to varied audiences is critical to maintaining 
support for this type of work. An area for further research 
could be exploration of alternative means to discuss system 
architecting among less technical audiences. 
The architecture modeling example presented in Chapter 
VI was simplified by orders of magnitude relative to 
actually modeling a warfare system with enough fidelity to 
support system development. Research for this paper did not 
reveal significant information pertaining to estimation of 
time or resources to perform architecture models. Some 
historical data for architecture product development has 
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